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THE THREAT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
J. PETER BYRNE*

Since the late 1980s, the academic authority of colleges and universities has
been subjected to continuing blasts of criticism. Culture warriors portray decayed
institutions where sixties radicals have seized control and terrorize students and the
few remaining honest faculty with demands for political conformity or bewilder
them with incomprehensible theorizing. Some valid criticisms by these writers can
be gleaned among their towering hyperbole and tendentious accusations. But the
overall effect has been to paint for the broader public an alarming, misleading
picture of intolerance and cant. The prevalence of this picture, however false it
may be, imperils the constitutional autonomy of colleges and universities protected
by the First Amendment. This article argues that increased judicial distrust of
academic decision making, operating within a vague and confusing doctrinal
framework, imperils the vitality of constitutional academic freedom. It seeks to
analyze this threat and vindicate the constitutional propriety of judicial deference
to internal academic decision making on matters related to core academic values.
The interpretation of academic freedom as a constitutional right in judicial
opinions remains frustratingly uncertain and paradoxical. After a period of
creative ambiguity and slow movement toward a workable equilibrium, judicial
interpretations of constitutional academic freedom in the past decade seemed to be
sliding toward a dangerous distrust of academic decision making. An alarming
series of decisions invoked academic freedom without regard to its historical
development or informing academic values, ignored it when it plainly directed
leaving colleges and universities alone, or put it on doctrinal skids that threatened
to whisk it into obscurity. What unifies these decisions, otherwise an uncouth
mishmash, is that they enhance the power of judges to set basic policies for
colleges and universities. Yet, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Grutter
v. Bollinger,' upholding the University of Michigan Law School's use of race in
admissions, represents a startling counter to this trend, prompting here a critical
examination of how seriously we may take the Grutter court's reliance on
academic freedom in that important opinion. Confusion reigns.
The depth of confusion and threat of descent may be illustrated by another
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for helpful comments
from David Luban, Robin West, and Robert Post, and from participants at workshops at the
Georgetown University Law Center and at the Committee on Politics, Philosophy, and Public
Policy, University of Maryland. Thanks for helpful research assistance go to Lee Berger, Tonya
Mitchell, and Jeff Johnson.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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contemporary decision, containing opinions by two intelligent and experienced
judges, earnestly trying to do the right thing. Vega v. Miller 2 involved a First
Amendment challenge by an untenured professor to his dismissal for professional
incompetence. Professor Vega, who apparently had an "at will" contract, taught a
composition class for entering freshmen at the New York Maritime Academy. 3 In
one class, he used a "clustering" exercise in which the students briskly called out
words related to a topic; the students chose sex as the topic. 4 After a genteel start,
the students soon were calling out strikingly vulgar expressions, some of which I
5
remember from my youth, others I had never heard before. No one complained.
But the school found out about the session in a roundabout way and promptly
notified Professor Vega it would not reappoint him for the upcoming year,
expressly relying on the inappropriateness of the clustering exercise and noting
6
that it could expose the school to liability for sexual harassment.
Vega's lawsuit eventually came to the Second Circuit on appeal from the trial
court's denial of a summary judgment for the individual administrator defendants,
who had claimed qualified immunity for their decision. 7 The court of appeals
reversed in a decision by Judge Newman; Judge Cabranes dissented. 8 Judge
Newman described the case as one in which:
a college teacher has been disciplined for permitting a classroom
exercise, initiated for legitimate purposes, to continue to the point and
beyond where students are calling out a series of vulgar, sexually
explicit words and phrases, many of which the professor writes on the
blackboard, either in words or with initials. 9
The court found that the administrators' decision to terminate was "objectively
reasonable" because in 1994, "the available authorities did not settle with certainty
the extent to which a college professor could be disciplined for permitting student
speech in a classroom to exceed reasonable bounds of discourse."' 0 The court
relied primarily on a case upholding the dismissal of a tenth grade mathematics
teacher for including photographs of bare breasted women in a film clip designed
to illustrate "persistence of vision."'I The court expressly did not decide whether
Professor Vega's academic freedom had been violated, because the finding of
qualified immunity resulted in the dismissal of the complaint against all the
2
defendants.'
2.
3.
4.

273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.at 462.
Id.at 463.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 462.
Id.
at 460.
Id. at 467.

10. Id. State officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil liability if their behavior was
"objectively reasonable," meaning that the unconstitutionality of their behavior was not "clearly
established at the time an action occurred." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
11. Vega, 273 F.3d at 468 (quoting Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd., 42 F.3d
719 (2d Cir. 1994)).

12.

Id. at 462.
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Judge Cabranes, in dissent, argued that the administrators fired Vega based on
an unconstitutionally vague sexual harassment policy and that their actions were
objectively unreasonable. 13 "A college teacher's First Amendment right to
academic freedom in the classroom was clearly established at the time of Vega's
dismissal and Vega's actions were clearly within that right." 14 Judge Cabranes
punctuated his dissent with strong claims about the importance of academic
freedom and the need for judicial protection of it. Citing two non-legal books
purporting to document pervasive intolerance and political oppression on college
and university campuses, 15 Judge Cabranes even asserted, "The need to protect
academic freedom on our college campuses is especially evident in the account of
the disheartening developments in the recent past .... -16 He embellished the
importance of the case:
Today the loser is a college teacher in a conservative academic setting
who used an "alternative" teaching technique with profane effect. In the
future, the major losers are likely to be "traditionalist" and
unconventional college teachers, whose method or speech is found
offensive by those who usually dominate our institutions of higher
education. The First Amendment, with its "special concern" for
academic freedom ... must protect all college teachers, especially in
the performance of their most important duty-teaching in the
classroom.17
There are many aspects of this case that cry out for discussion. First, the
majority's conclusion relies on the pervasive ambiguity of what academic freedom
protects to exonerate the defendants. If the classroom is the center of teachers'
work, how can the extent to which they can be disciplined for prompting or
permitting students to speak vulgarly be unclear? If that is not settled, what is? In
fact, most courts hold that academic freedom does not protect an individual's
teaching methods from disapproval by school administrators.18
Second, the administrators had the contractual authority to terminate untenured
professors they believed in their professional judgment to be ineffective. What
precisely about the decision here was questionable on either substantive or
procedural grounds? Judge Newman decided the case on the narrower ground of

13.
14.

Id. at 473.
Id. at 480.

15.

ALAN

CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY

(1998); DAVID BROMWITCH, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS (1992). It is startling that a judge with
extensive trial experience would accept these highly charged and partisan indictments as
establishing "the politicization of higher education." Vega, 273 F.3d at 472. I take up the nature
and consequence of such books in Part 111.
16. Vega, 273 F.3d at 472.
17. Id. at 471-72.
18. See Carley v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 737 P.2d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) and cases cited
therein. Courts disagree whether the boundaries of a professor's free speech rights are sufficiently
clear to deny administrators qualified immunity. Compare Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll.,
92 F.3d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that boundaries are too unclear), with Hardy v.
Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that boundaries are
sufficiently clear).
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immunity, probably to save the administrators from trial on the merits, but it leaves
one wondering whether their decision was primarily an academic evaluation or
whether they were suppressing free talk about sex for ideological reasons or from
fear about litigation. Judge Cabranes apparently believes that constitutional
academic freedom of the professor trumps the contractual rights of the
administrators.
Third, the case presents fundamental issues about how active a role the judiciary
should play in policing such decisions by administrators to ensure classroom
freedom and to settle such questions as the bounds of decorum in a classroom. The
traditional legal means for insulating a professor from such oversight is tenure, and
academic freedom cannot be protected systematically without contractual job
security and specifications about the nature and process for professional
evaluations, all quite lacking in this case but exciting no judicial comment. Judge
Cabranes justified judicial control by reference to the supposed threat to freedom
on campuses, but how real is this threat either generally or in the case under
review?
Finally, one must note that the case does not involve any obviously serious
intellectual issue, for example, some professor defending the views of Islamic
fundamentalists or the morality of some unpopular sexual practice. We are dealing
with a classroom exercise for pre-freshmen that turned raw, some doubtful
judgment by a teacher, and a decision by administrators that might seem
precipitous. The case hardly threatened to "impose a straightjacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges," 19 as Judge Cabranes claimed, quoting from a
case in which such a threat really was present. 20 But the inability to settle such
ordinary matters in a court of appeals promises endless future litigation.
Vega v. Miller well captures the confusion surrounding judicial forays at
constitutional academic freedom, and the dissent typifies the trend of decisions
justifying greater judicial intrusion into academic decision making on the grounds
that colleges and universities are places rife with intolerance, although needing
maximum individual liberty. This article seeks to clarify and explain this trend. I
describe and critique several cases decided during and after the 1990s, involving
the application of the First Amendment to disputes concerning colleges and
universities. Although these cases include several different types of disputes, I
argue that they can best be understood as a group, highlighting the need for a
general theory of the place of colleges and universities within the constitutional
order. In the course of this analysis, I apply and expand certain approaches that I
have explained in prior articles concerning academic freedom and student free
speech. 2' While these approaches do not now amount to a comprehensive theory

19.

Vega, 273 F.3d at 474.

20. Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding
unconstitutional interrogation by state attorney general of university lecturer about the political
content of classroom lecture)).
21. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom, A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989) [hereinafter Byrne, Special Concern]; J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom of Part-Time Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2001) [hereinafter Byrne, PartTime Faculty]; J. Peter Byrne, ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom in Scholarship and in Court,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., January 5, 2001, at B13 [hereinafter Byrne, Scholarship and Court].
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of the constitutional place of higher education, they may be building blocks of such
a theory.
Part I reviews the concept of academic freedom and its development as an
academic norm and later uncertain acceptance as a constitutional interest protected
by the First Amendment. I claim here that by about 1990, something like a
scholarly consensus emerged that emphasized that constitutional academic
freedom protected the "intellectual life of a university" from outside political
interference, that this protection extended to institutional decision making on
academic grounds, and that this institutional interest qualified whatever individual
speech rights any member of the academic community might have against college
and university officials. The breadth and importance of this consensus will also be
examined.
Part II addresses subsequent judicial decisions that depart from this consensus.
Here I group these cases into four categories shaped by the recurring factual
patterns or specific doctrinal developments they involve. These are a) cranky
professors; b) vulgar students; c) absorption of academic freedom into the doctrine
of government speech; and d) affirmative action. I argue that these cases taken as
a whole threaten the demise of academic freedom as a constitutional right with its
own speech values and coherence, with serious consequences for higher education.
At the end, I consider whether Grutter likely will change the course of
interpretation for the better.
Part III attempts to suggest some reasons why recent cases have taken the
directions they have. Here it becomes necessary to offer some observations on
both intellectual and demographic changes within higher education. My claim
here will be that these changes argue for continuing judicial protection of colleges
and universities from outside interference, and principled judicial restraint from
deciding academic disputes. Finally, I suggest some concrete steps that supporters
of higher education should take to defend intellectual autonomy and establish a
new consensus about the role of colleges and universities within the constitutional
structure.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Academic freedom developed as an ethical and organizational principle before
it had any legal significance. 22 The classic statement by the American Association
23
of University Professors ("AAUP"), the 1915 General Declaration of Principles,
reasoned from the role of the professor in the emerging research universities as a
scholar seeking truth according to the lights of modem scholarly disciplines, 24 a
teacher of nearly mature students, 25 and an independent expert offering guidance to
the public. 26 It declared that freedom for faculty in research, publication, and
22. This section draws on Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21.
23. 1915 General Declaration of Principles, 1 AAUP BULL. 17 (1915), reprintedas App. A,
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure in 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 393 app. A (1990) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
24. See 1915 Declaration, supra note 23 at 401.
25. Id. at 402-03.

26. Id. at 396.
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teaching was essential for progress in knowledge. 27 Accordingly, ideologically
tainted personnel moves mandated by university trustees or by politicians
threatened the basic function of higher education itself.
The 1915 Declaration sought to achieve this professional autonomy through
nurturing respect for the guiding norms and by the structural devices of peer
review and tenure. 28 Peer review specifies that evaluation of a faculty member be
only of his professional competence as a scholar and teacher without regard to the
political tendencies of his work. 29 Moreover, the evaluation should be performed
by other professors within his field competent to evaluate his work. Although
legally the lay board and its appointed administrators contract for the university,
they should normally defer to judgments made by faculty acting in schools and
departments.
Tenure provides faculty who have earned it the presumption of professional
competence and continued employment. 30 A tenure system presupposes extensive
efforts to evaluate the professional work of junior faculty culminating in a tenure
review involving inside and outside evaluators of writings, classroom visits, and
votes by tenure committees and faculties with reviews by deans and other
academic administrators. After tenure is awarded, the professor can be dismissed
only for cause shown in a hearing in which the college or university bears some
burden of proof Thus tenure effectively protects the academic freedom of the
tenured by creating barriers to dismissal and exposing the reasons behind dismissal
to ensure that they are not improper. It has other good and bad consequences for
higher education that have rendered it controversial, particularly in periods of
economic stringency and for institutions seeking to change direction, but its role as
31
a shield for academic freedom has kept it remarkably intact for nearly a century.
The AAUP was strikingly successful in achieving acceptance of its approach to
academic freedom and tenure among research institutions. By 1940, all the major
organizations of universities and administrators joined with the AAUP in agreeing
32
to a Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("Statement").
This Statement made the AAUP approach the standard for the relations between
institutions and faculty. With minor changes, it has endured for more than sixty
years, while American higher education has grown in scope and scale to an extent
unimaginable to the drafters. 33 Most small colleges and religiously affiliated
institutions that initially resisted the Statement eventually embraced it as the gold

27. Id. at 396-97.
28. Id. at 405-06.
29. Id. at 404-05.
30. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom Without Tenure? (American Association for
Higher Education, New Pathways Working Paper No. 5, 1997).
31. An important recent study examines how, and evaluates how well, tenure operates in
many different circumstances. THE QUESTIONS OF TENURE (Richard P. Chait, ed., 2002).
32. AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure With 1970
Interpretive Comments, in POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS (9th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm.
33. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 53 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-4 (1990).
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standard of higher education, although not without criticism and complexity. 34 At
the same time, the AAUP continued to specify and apply the Statement through
investigations of complaints by aggrieved faculty, issuing reports on violations,
and maintaining a censure list of offending institutions on which no mainstream
college or university wishes to appear. 35 The success of the AAUP paralleled the
success of the American model of higher education in which faculty are expected
to pursue research and publication, as well as teach and manage the academic
standards for the institution, and individual schools compete for faculty, students,
research grants, and philanthropy.
It is essential to note that while the system of academic freedom protects the
professional autonomy of the individual professor, it does so primarily within the
conventions of the scholarly community. A junior professor must master the field
as defined by her seniors to be approved, although mastery may involve persuasive
modifications of disciplinary assumptions. Negative evaluations on professional
grounds are as necessary for this system as is respiration for the body; without such
collective rejections, disciplines would lose coherence and academia's claims to
advance knowledge would suffer. Even after tenure, peer pressure and interstitial
management (such as raises determined by a dean or class assignments approved
by a department chair) push toward professional standards.
No one claims that this system operates perfectly in every instance. Without
doubt, faculties sometime award or deny tenure based on extraneous grounds or
are reversed by administrators without justification. Moreover, senescence may
claim tenured faculty within institutions unwilling to insist on standards. Notably,
the efforts of the AAUP have focused more on promoting institutional adoption of
procedures for avoiding or resolving such claims, rather than in adjudicating
individual complaints. Thus, a school on the censure list may be removed by
adopting recommended procedures for the future rather than by retaining the
complainant. 36 While this certainly stems from the limited resources of the AAUP,
it also reflects the understanding that academic freedom and tenure are
instrumental rights justified by their contribution to knowledge, education, and the
public good rather than by an inherent right of the individual.
Law played no positive role in the development or initial enforcement of
academic freedom. The principles and procedures were developed by academics,
adopting German practice, for internal governance and to make up for the lack of
authority or protection extended to faculty by law. 37 Professors in the early
twentieth century were typically employed either at-will or on short-term contracts,
thus subject to dismissal or non-renewal for no reason at all. 38 By 1940,

34. Id.
35. See AAUP, Developments Relating to Censure by the Association, at
http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/devcen.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) for a current list of censured

institutions.
36.
2002).

See AAUP, What is Censure?, at http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/prcenback.htm (Mar. 7,

37. See LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 384-418
(1965); WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY 93-138

(1961).
38.

Without tenure or some other form of long-term contract, protecting academic freedom
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employment contracts could either expressly guarantee a professor academic
freedom or incorporate the protections of tenure, making these principles legally
39
enforceable as contract rights in individual cases.
The first appearance of the words "academic freedom" in a reported judicial
opinion was hardly auspicious. Upon petition of a parent, a New York judge in
1940 ordered City College not to employ Bertrand Russell as a professor because
of his bad moral character, evidenced by his writings on sex. 40 The judge
defended this high-handed order against the college's claim that it violated
academic freedom by stating:
Academic freedom does not mean academic license. It is the freedom to
do good and not to teach evil. . . . Academic freedom cannot teach that
abduction is lawful nor that adultery is attractive and good for the
community. There are norms and criteria of truth which have been
41
recognized by the founding fathers.
This decision should remind us that judges are as capable of interpreting academic
freedom to embody popular or civil values, rather than academic norms, as are
trustees or legislators.
The Supreme Court first incorporated academic freedom into the First
Amendment beginning in the 1950s in response to popular concerns about
"loyalty" of faculty members. But the Court's invocation of academic freedom
was not accompanied by precise legal definition of the term nor reasoned
justification of its place within the First Amendment. The opinions invoked
academic freedom in rhetorical flourishes, while invalidating political
investigations or loyalty oaths on other grounds. Moreover, although the opinions
affirmed the values of free inquiry that animate the AAUP approach, they
described the rights at stake more as those of the colleges and universities than of
the individual faculty members. While the facts of the cases may have encouraged
this, as they involved outside political intrusions in which the teacher and the
school were united, the Court's description of institutional rights both drew on a
long indigenous legal tradition and had significant legal consequences.
The first and most significant case was Sweezy v. New Hampshire,42 which held
on obscure grounds that the attorney general of New Hampshire could not question
a guest lecturer about the political content of remarks given in a political science
class at the University of New Hampshire. 43 The Court's fullest statement about
academic freedom was given in a paragraph:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities

at reasonable cost is difficult. See Byrne, Part-TimeFaculty, supra note 21, at 584.
39.

See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 150-

54 (discussing the enforceability of academic freedom norms incorporated into faculty contracts).
40. Kay v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1940). For a general
discussion of the case see THOM WEIDLICH, APPOINTMENT DENIED: THE INQUISITION OF
BERTRAND RUSSELL (2000) and THE BERTRAND RUSSELL CASE (John Dewey & Horace M.

Kallen eds., 1941).
41. Kay, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
42. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
43. Id. at 254-55.
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is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot be made. Particularly is that true of the social sciences, where
few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
44
stagnate and die.
Chief Justice Warren's classic statement energetically unites the values of
democratic self-government with those of knowledge and criticism. 45 Yet it does
not indicate who holds the right, nor how it should be balanced.
Justice Frankfurter's influential concurring opinion rested on the same values,
but more emphatically located the right in the institution itself, finding that it
required "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a
university. '46 He went on to quote an academic statement from South Africa,
which specified "'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study. ' 47 Neither opinion made any reference
to the AAUP or the principles of academic freedom it had established. Several
subsequent opinions added to the store of rhetorical encomiums for academic
48
freedom, but little to doctrinal elaboration.
The Court's early emphasis on the rights of the institution itself as the creator of
the conditions for free scholarship and teaching took on additional weight from
Justice Powell's invocation of it in his concurring opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 49 Although agreeing with the plurality that the
affirmative action admissions plan under review violated the Equal Protection
Clause, Justice Powell argued that admissions decisions that treated ethnicity as
one factor among many could be sustained. 50 Crucially, he based this conclusion
on the academic freedom of a university "to determine for itself on academic
51
grounds . . . who may be taught," as described by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy.
Thus, the weight of the university's First Amendment right could counterbalance
the Equal Protection right of a white applicant to be considered without regard to
44. Id. at 250.
45. David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual"and "Institutional"Academic
Freedom Under the FirstAmendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 227, 240 (1990).
46. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
47. Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. In particular, Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), established that
academic freedom justifies judicial use of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to strike down
statutes. It also described the classroom as "peculiarly the marketplace of ideas," setting off much
speculation about what that means. Id.
49. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
50. Id.at 312.
51. Id. See supra, text accompanying notes 42-47.
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race. 52 Bakke set the method for considering institutional academic freedom in a
constitutional case: the Court would defer to the university only insofar as it was
persuaded that the university was acting on academic, rather than political,
grounds. 53 Justice Stevens subsequently followed suit in his important concurring
opinion in Widmar v. Vincent,54 citing Bakke for the "academic freedom of public
universities," and arguing that educational decisions affecting speech generally
"should be made by academicians, not by federal judges. '55 Finally, the Court
unanimously rejected a student's challenge to academic dismissal, invoking a
56
university's constitutional interest in making its own educational decisions.
Thus, by the late 1980s, substantial momentum carried the view that academic
freedom protected college and university decision making concerning academic
matters from political interference. But during the same period, courts had
established that public universities were "state actors" against whom the individual
constitutional rights of faculty and students could be enforced. 57 Would academic
freedom inhibit courts from enforcing the First Amendment or other rights of
members of the academic community against the institutions?
The courts by now had been elaborating constitutional rights of faculty and
students enforceable against state schools for some time. Many of these stem from
the civil rights and anti-war movements, which established that institutions
themselves, as state actors, can violate the rights of their members. 58 The Supreme
Court extended this to student First Amendment rights against college and
university authorities similar to any citizen's rights against the police, although it
affirmed the authority of college and university officials to protect an educational
mission, for example, to bar student organizations that "infringe reasonable
campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education. '59 In the 60s and 70s, these distinctions were
pushed to extremes and federal judges had many occasions to attempt to sort out
student rights from reasonable campus rules. 60 At the same time, the Court began

52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
53. Id. at 312.
54. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
55. Id. at 278-79.
56. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985).
57. State universities would seem to fall within the test for public entities set out in Lebron
v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) ("We hold that where, as here, the
Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives,
and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation,
the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.").
58. The paradox of the state action doctrine for higher education is that it treats
diametrically differently state and private schools that otherwise resemble each other more than
not, assimilating the former to standards developed for the state itself while leaving the latter free
from constitutional restraint. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 299-300. The
AAUP's academic freedom has always applied to both equally. Moreover, the Court has
consistently recognized institutional freedom of state universities from state government
interference.
59. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
60. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399,
428-40(1991).
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to protect public employees, including teachers, from dismissal for exercise of
First Amendment rights to speak on matters of public concern. 61 Finally, some
lower courts seemed to protect individual professors from institutional
punishments for the political tendencies of their academic work as a matter of
62
individual academic freedom protected by the First Amendment.
By now, courts and scholars began to see conflict between individual and
institutional conceptions of constitutional academic freedom. The Supreme Court
stated, "Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students . . . but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decision making by the academy itself. '63 Judge
Posner observed that academic freedom denotes "both the freedom of the academy
to pursue its ends without interference from the government... and the freedom of
the individual teacher . . . to pursue his ends without interference from the
academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict, as in this case." 64 Several
distinguished scholars began to explore the origins and nature of the distinction
65
between individual and institutional academic freedom.
In 1989, I wrote an article to explain the confusion and justify priority for
institutional rights in constitutional academic freedom. 66 In the course of a
comprehensive account, I made several general arguments. First, institutional
academic freedom stands on a legal foundation reaching back to the origins of the
European university in the middle ages, which was preserved in the United States
in the nineteenth century through the common law doctrine of academic abstention
and through state constitutional provisions.67 Second, the non-legal tradition of
academic freedom requires colleges and universities to evaluate the speech of
faculty members on academic grounds, and federal judges will have trouble
distinguishing among valid academic and invalid ideological grounds in intramural
disputes. 68 Third, judicial imposition of the values of the First Amendment to
resolve such disputes cannot be justified any more than would imposition of
61. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
62. See, e.g., Oilman v. Toll, 518 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D. Md. 1981) (stating that
expression of political beliefs is entitled to full First Amendment protection); Cooper v. Ross, 472
F. Supp. 802, 813-14 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (discussing First Amendment protection of professor's
beliefs stated in an academic book review).
63. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985). The Court
immediately quoted the four freedoms and cited Bakke. Id. at 227 (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The case involved a substantive due process challenge to an
academic dismissal from a medical school, which the Court rejected, holding that its task was
limited to determining whether the decision "was such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment." Id. at
227. See also Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (holding that
student who was fully informed of faculty's dissatisfaction with her progress was accorded
procedural due process despite lack of formal hearing).
64. Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985).
65. See, e.g., Mark Yudof, Three Faces ofAcademic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REv. 831 (1987);
Walter Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions ofAcademic Freedom in America,
66 TEx. L. REV. 1265 (1988).
66. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21.
67. Id. at 321-22.
68. Id. at 326.
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loyalty or sexual probity norms by a legislature; both displace academic norms and
threaten the communal provision of knowledge. 69 The First Amendment generally
stands on the foundation that government officials can never be the judge of the
value of a citizen's speech, but academic freedom requires that faculty peers and
appropriate academic administrators judge on academic grounds the value of an
individual's scholarship and teaching. 70 Accordingly, courts can play a more
constructive role in protecting from political interference those colleges and
universities which themselves provide the structures for, and protect the practice
of, free teaching and scholarship. 7 1 I have acknowledged that judicial enforcement
of an individual right of academic freedom could be warranted in a flagrant case of
ideological prejudice.
In response, Professor David Rabban wrote an article taking issue with my
proposal that judges generally stay out of speech-related disputes between
professors and institutions. 72 Drawing on his first-hand experience litigating for
the AAUP and his unsurpassed knowledge of the history of the First Amendment,
Professor Rabban argued that courts had made a good start in fashioning an
individual right of academic freedom that fit within the First Amendment and
respected the institutional context of higher education. 73 He did "generally agree
with Byrne that judges should not review good faith debates within universities
about the merits of unpopular or unconventional ideas."'74 Nonetheless, he cited
judicial experience in managing Title VII cases to support his view that courts
could separate pretextual invocations of academic needs from real disputes. 75 He
concluded:
The most important response to Byrne is that judges can enforce the
academic freedom of individual professors against administrators,
trustees, and faculty peers, without violating a legitimate conception of
institutional academic freedom or abandoning appropriate judicial
deference to academic decision-making. The judiciary is more
deliberative and less political than either the legislature or the
76
executive.
Both then and now I observe the narrowness of the difference between our
views. It might be said that I favor a constitutional emphasis on an institutional

69. Id. at 307-08.
70. Id. at 308-09.
71. Id. at 281-94. Obviously, universities are subject to a broad array of legislative and
constitutional duties in order to safeguard basic public policy. In Byrne, Special Concern, supra
note 21, at 330, I discuss standards for assessing when government regulation invades
institutional academic freedom, essentially elaborating on what counts as "academic grounds" in
the language of Sweezy.
72. Rabban, supra note 45.
73. Id. at 252-55.
74. Id. at 283.
75. Id. at 264-65. This is a valid point as deference in interpreting academic standards is
relevant in each case. But I think the crucial difference is that judges understand discrimination
and have jurisdiction to explore its implications but do not understand academic freedom and will
tend to substitute generic First Amendment concepts in its place.
76. Id. at 286-87.
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right normatively dependent on the institution's respecting individual rights, while
Professor Rabban favors an individual right sensitive to the role of the institution
in safeguarding the scholarly and educational context. Both of us recognize that
constitutional academic freedom exists to preserve professionally informed
teaching and scholarship from political and ideological interference, primarily but
not exclusively by non-academics; neither of us believes that judges can be relied
on to resolve close intramural cases without risking displacement of fundamental
academic values. The disagreement lay in the extent to which judges can be
trusted, particularly with regard to academic administrators. 77 This remains a
legitimate question about which people may disagree. Decisions since 1990 have
not brightened my assessment of the capacity of courts to accord respect to
academic values.
Perhaps it is too much to say that there was a consensus among courts and
commentators in 1990 about what was known and what was at issue concerning
constitutional academic freedom. But the trend of judicial decisions and the
concerns of various scholars did seem to converge upon a variety of concerns
about how to balance competing values and best preserve the traditional excellence
of our system of higher education, should some social movement emerge to
threaten it. The events of the past decade make such convergence appear
antediluvian, making the disagreements among scholars appear as minor irritants
in a golden era of peace. For in the past decade or so, judicial and other
constitutional decisions have threatened the continued vitality of constitutional
academic freedom.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME

In this section, I want to examine and critique what I take to be the leading
cases on constitutional academic freedom over the last decade or so. These cases
reflect new attempts by schools to protect students from racial insults and sexual
harassment, the sharp critique of "political correctness," continued conflict over
affirmative action in student admissions, and the evolution of new constitutional
doctrines. I divide the cases into four categories to facilitate consideration: 1)
professors' speech; 2) student speech; 3) the relation of the professor to
government speech; and 4) affirmative action as an instance of academic
policymaking. This order allows me to address the significance of Grutter v.

77. There may be a jurisprudential disagreement as well. What should be the source of the
content of the First Amendment? Professor Rabban sees courts elaborating individual academic
freedom by interpreting the inherited doctrine of free speech in the context of higher education.
Id. at 287. I want courts to preserve the system of free expression within the college or university
as they have found it. Rather than employing a liberal universalist premise in my interpretation of
academic freedom, I work from a broadly Burkean defense of the indigenous speech norms of the
university, which I view as paideic or jurisgenerative in the sense used by Professor Robert
Cover. Robert Cover, Forward:Nomos and Narrative, 97 MARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). In other
words, I do not view academic freedom as a matter of courts imposing civil notions of liberty on
a state institution (i.e., the public university), as much as deference to and even protection of the
autonomous normative world of academic speech. The Constitution does not create the speech
norms of academic freedom; they have been created by the values and practical needs of
organized scholarship and advanced teaching.
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Bollinger both for academic policymaking and as the most recent important
academic freedom decision.
A. Professors Disciplined for Offensive Speech
No act implicates academic freedom more directly than the disciplining of a
professor for expression in the classroom or in scholarship. In this section, I
discuss reported cases where academic administrators penalized a teacher for
speech. Thus, we are not here considering easy cases like an attorney general
questioning a lecturer about the political content of his speech, where all agree that
constitutional academic freedom provides legal protection either to the professor or
his institution. This is plainly an area where academic freedom as an educational
norm should constrain the behavior of academic administrators, whether or not
there may be any legal consequences. Finally, it is the area where Professor
Rabban's and my approach to constitutional academic freedom diverge most
clearly. He views judges as able effectively to protect individual academic
freedom in all cases save where they reflect disagreement about academic
principles, 78 while I think them incompetent to give content to academic freedom
in all but the most blatant forms of ideological exclusion.
Let us begin with a case where I agree that the court was justified in protecting
a controversial professor. Still, the timing and manner of the court's analysis
engenders concern about its role. Michael Levin was a tenured Professor in the
Department of Philosophy at the City College of New York ("CCNY"). 79 Between
1987 and 1989, he published pieces arguing that affirmative action was misguided
because the disparity in academic performance between blacks and whites was
caused by the lower intelligence of blacks and could not be remedied.80 Students
protested and the Faculty Senate condemned Levin's views, while affirming his
right to express them without constraint. 81 In the spring semester of 1990, the dean
of the college, reacting to Levin's third publication, arranged an alternate section
of Levin's Philosophy 101 class and invited students enrolled in the class to
transfer. 82 Subsequently, the president of CCNY denounced Levin's views in a
press conference and organized an "Ad Hoc Committee on Academic Rights and
Responsibilities" to assess whether Levin's writings exceeded the bounds of
academic freedom and amounted to conduct meriting sanction.8 3 Levin filed suit
alleging that these actions violated his First Amendment rights.

78. Rabban, supra note 45, at 287.
79. Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). City College was
convulsed at the same time by controversy concerning Leonard Jeffries, who was removed from
his post as chair of the Black Studies Department for making anti-Semitic public remarks.
Jeffries' suit claiming violation of his First Amendment rights failed because his position as
department chair made him an officer of the college whose views could be attributed to the
college in a way that no professor's could. Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
Academic freedom protects professors, not administrators, although the court never put it in such
terms.
80. Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 899-903.
81. Id. at 903-09.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Id. at 911-12.
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In an angry opinion, Judge Conboy found that the college administrators
violated Professor Levin's First Amendment rights and enjoined the provision of
alternate classes and any disciplinary action against him based solely on his
expression of ideas. 84 Crucially, the court found as a fact that the administrators
had created the sections and constituted the committee purposefully to officially
85
condemn his views, stigmatize him, and encourage students to abandon his class.
The court also found that the actions taken were intended to, and did, chill
Professor Levin in expressing his views. 86 These findings were upheld on appeal,
87
although the remedy was moderated.
The trial court's conclusion in Levin seems to protect appropriately individual
academic freedom, because the college administrators intentionally sought to
silence a professor through extraordinary administrative means. Levin seems to be
a case where ideological abhorrence and concern for popular anger drove
administrators to discipline a professor indirectly for his views. As such, it falls
within that small category of cases where I acknowledge the propriety of judicial
protection of individual academic freedom.
Yet the district court opinion in the case is troubling in its sweep, vehemence,
and disregard for academic context. Neither the district court nor the court of
appeals framed the case as one of constitutional academic freedom, but instead, as
one of free speech generally. This invites disregard of appropriate limitations on
academic speech. It may be true that Professor Levin's writings raise questions
about his professional competence in drawing social and educational conclusions
from data about intellectual testing. Colleges and universities do not need to
continue to employ professors whose writings clearly exhibit a lack or loss of
professional competence. Thus, historians who deny the holocaust or astronomers
who claim that the moon is made of green cheese may be dismissed. Some
expression, even within one's discipline, can properly prompt disciplinary action.
What Levin lacked were scrupulously fair procedures addressing the question of
professional competence. The ad hoc committee was not constituted by colleagues
in Levin's field, it took no evidence, and it did not give Professor Levin an
88
opportunity to answer the charges.
Similarly, the alternate classes were set up before any students requested release
from Professor Levin, and no evidence was ever introduced other than that he was
a good and fair teacher.8 9 Thus, the court's conclusion that the alternate classes
were more an administrative statement than an educational adjustment seems
warranted. But what if a professor conveyed to his students in class that he
believed that those who were black were less intelligent than those who were
white? Surely then academic authorities could provide relief to black students who
claimed that they could not learn in such a classroom. It is a closer question

84.
85.

Id. at 918.
Id. at 918.

86.
87.

Id. at 920.
The court of appeals granted Levin only declaratory, not injunctive relief. Levin v.

Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1992).

88.
89.

Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 923.
Id. at 915.

94

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 3 1, No. I

whether to accommodate students who discover that their professor has expressed
such views outside the classroom and who feel intimidated thereby; forming a
committee to consider such a question before deciding seems responsible. But
Judge Conboy stated: "Even if the defendants had managed to offer any credible
evidence to support their claimed fear that exposure in the campus environment to
Professor Levin's views might somehow have caused some students harm, such
evidence could have constitutionally been accorded no weight." 90 In support for
that view, he relied on a case involving student extracurricular speech. 9 1 But any
useable notion of academic freedom must distinguish between the effect of a
professor's views on his students and political advocacy by a student
organization. 92 The Second Circuit took a somewhat broader view: "Formation of
the alternative sections would not be unlawful if done to further a legitimate
educational interest that outweighed the infringement on Professor Levin's First
Amendment rights. '93 The recognition that academic decisions furthering
educational objectives deserve constitutional weight is helpful. But I would argue
that if the actions were taken in reasonable pursuance of legitimate educational
concerns, following appropriate procedures, there would be no infringement of the
professor's academic freedom and therefore no infringement of any First
Amendment rights.
Did the courts need to intervene? Judge Conboy began his opinion: "This case
raises serious constitutional questions that go to the heart of the current national
debate on what has come to be denominated as 'political correctness' in speech
and thought on the campuses of the nation's colleges and universities. '94 His
quotations from his own belligerent questioning of the college officials and his
rhetoric throughout display clearly his contempt for them. 95 Yet the academic
system itself performed reasonably well. Professor Levin was protected by his
tenure. He could not be dismissed without proving incompetence or some other
cause, and the administrators never even tried. The faculty senate, having
condemned Levin's views, as they plainly were entitled to do, staunchly opposed
97
any attempt to remove him. 96 His department supported his continued teaching.
Even the ad hoc committee concluded that no action should be brought against
him. 98 Thus, even in a city polarized by racial tension, at a college serving
primarily a minority population, with demagogues on each side, the worst that
happened to a proponent of white racial superiority was the stigma of alternate
classes and the threat of presidential action. In context, I believe that was enough
to justify judicial intervention, but the faculty of City College probably would have
90.

Id. at 923.
91. The case relied upon, Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir.
1976), is one of many finding unconstitutional a state university's unwillingness to treat a gay
student organization on par with others.
92. This idea is developed in Byrne, supra note 60, at 424-25.
93. Levin, 966 F.2d at 88.
94. Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 897-98.
95. See id. at 904-16.
96. Id. at 907.
97. Levin, 770 F. Supp. At 908-09.
98. Levin, 996 F.2d at 89.
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brought the matter to a fair conclusion eventually without judicial involvement. In
any event, it is self-righteous to describe them as being in the grip of political
correctness.
Fortunately, reported cases in which professors' rights have been so clearly
invaded are rare. 99 The problems with Professor Don Silva at the University of
New Hampshire are more typical of the disputes that preoccupied courts during the
decade.100 Moreover, studying the Silva dispute offers the opportunity to compare
treatment of the case by a U.S. District Court, the AAUP, and commentators on
"political correctness."
Professor Silva was a tenured instructor in a two-year certificate program in
applied science at the University of New Hampshire. 10 1 In the spring of 1992, he
was teaching a class in technical writing and in one class used sexual metaphors to
explain focus in writing. 102 Two days later, he gave an example of a definition:
10 3
Six
"Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with a vibrator under the plate."
female students complained about the two classes, and added concerns about the
teacher's frequent use of sexual imagery and recounted several sexually suggestive

99. Indeed, as thoroughgoing a critic of modem academia as Professor Hamilton admits that
"while there have been investigations and discipline under harassment and discrimination codes
and policies, there appear to be no instances where universities have instituted formal proceedings
under a tenure code to penalize a tenured professor for competent academic inquiry or speech that
opposes fundamentalist academic left ideology." NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 82 (1995). He condemns the university's
action against Silva as a more procedurally limited attack by adherents of that ideology. Id. at
82. One recent case where the court's intervention seems manifestly justified is Hardy v.
Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001). Hardy alleged that he taught communications
courses at the college for several years, receiving excellent evaluations. Id. at 674. In one
introductory class, he discussed with students how language was used to oppress social groups
and solicited examples; the students gave several, including "nigger" and "bitch." Id. at 674. One
African-American student complained about the use of those terms (Hardy ironically forbade
students from using abusive language in class discussions) both to school authorities and to a
local minister who was a civil rights activist. Id. The minister also complained, threatening to
dissuade students from attending the college, which already suffered from declining enrollment.
Id. Hardy was soon dismissed, apparently because of the threat. Id. The Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling that Hardy's allegations stated a claim. Id. The Court essentially found that
Hardy was protected by academic freedom, since his use of the terms "was germane to the subject
matter, not gratuitously used by Hardy in an abusive manner." Id. at 679. While the Court's
doctrinal structure for reaching this conclusion is inadequate, its instincts for the range of the
limits of institutional autonomy seem sound, because it found that the college did not act from
considered academic judgment, but presented "a classic illustration of 'undifferentiated fear' of
disturbance" from outside oppression. Id. at 682.
100. See Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
101. Id. at 247.
102. According to Silva's complaint, he said:
I will put focus in terms of sex, so you can better understand it. Focus is like sex. You
seek a target. You zero in on your subject. You move from side to side. You close in
on the subject. You bracket the subject and center on it. Focus connects experience and
language. You and the subject become one.
Id. at 299. It is readily apparent that small variations in the words actually used and
accompanying vocal and physical expression could accentuate the affect of such a statement.
103. Id.
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comments made to them outside of class. 104 A dean promptly again created
"shadow" classes for students who wished release from Professor Silva. 10 5 After
informal attempts to settle students' complaints failed, the school reprimanded
Silva and then suspended him without pay. 10 6 When he pursued grievance
procedures, the hearing panel and subsequent appeals board, dominated by
students, considered the case without precise charges being filed and without clear
burdens of proof allocated; both concluded that he had violated the university's
sexual harassment policy and agreed that he should be suspended without pay for
107
at least one year and enter counseling at his own expense.
Silva filed suit claiming that his First Amendment and due process rights had
been violated. 10 8 Judge Devine granted Silva's motion for a preliminary
injunction, finding that the university had violated his First Amendment rights. 10 9
Bizarrely, he found as a fact that "the belly dancing statement was not 'of a sexual
nature.""1 0 He also found that the students had mistakenly taken the reference to
the vibrator to refer to a sexual device, and that their misunderstanding had lead
them erroneously to find Silva's statements offensive."] The judge also found that
Silva's statements "advanced his valid educational objective[s]" and were made in
a "professionally appropriate manner."' 1 2 Although the judge made inconclusive
findings on Silva's procedural claims, he did find that the university failed to
follow the grievance procedures detailed in the Faculty Handbook, which was
incorporated into Silva's contract.1 13 The judge ordered Silva reinstated with back
pay'14
The AAUP investigated the Silva case while the district court case was
pending.' 15 Its report emphasized that the university's handling of the incident
involved "numerous serious departures from standards of academic due
process."1 6 In particular, the AAUP was concerned that no faculty committee had
ever evaluated Silva's conduct under orderly procedures and following a standard
of proof that took account of Silva's academic freedom in the classroom.1 7 The
report found valid the concerns of faculty at the university, which "saw the
administration as enforcing the university's sexual harassment policy without

104.

Id. at 300.

105. Id. at 303.
106. Id.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 312-13.
Id.
Id. at313.
Id. at321-32.
Id. at 332.

115.

Report, Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of New Hampshire, 80 ACADEME

70 (Nov.-Dec. 1994). As is typical, the report was prepared by an investigating committee and
then approved by Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, chaired at the time by the
distinguished authority on the Constitution and higher education, Professor Robert O'Neil.
116. Id. at80.
117. Id.
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taking principles of academic freedom into adequate account."'118 The report
stated:
It might be reasonable to conclude that Professor Silva's statement and
conduct constituted sexual harassment and thus provided "adequate
cause" for the sanctions that were imposed on him. Or one might
conclude that Professor Silva's remarks in the classroom warranted
protection under principles of academic freedom and that he was guilty
only of poor judgment in the ways that he sought to establish a close
relationship with his students. Whatever the assessment, however, it
should properly have been made by a faculty hearing body following a
full adjudicative hearing.1 19
Comparing the court's and AAUP's assessment of the incident is revealing.
Judge Devine crudely applied standard First Amendment analysis to find that Silva
had a constitutional right to speak as he did in the classroom. He avoided the main
conflict in values that animate the entire case by incredibly finding that Silva did
not inject sex into the lesson-it was all in the. minds of the female students.
Given this wooden finding, presumably any response from any academic authority
within the university would violate Silva's constitutional rights by chilling the
exercise of his rights on the basis of the content of his speech. By contrast, the
AAUP acknowledged that speech in class that gratuitously involves sex can fall
below professional standards and be sanctioned; it concerns itself with specifying
the proper standards and procedures for schools to resolve such matter on
academic grounds.1 20 The court had no business vindicating Silva's teaching, but
the AAUP made a contribution by analyzing the defects in the university's
handling of harassment complaints based on classroom speech.
There is only one other reported case addressing college or university attempts
to discipline a professor for sexually offensive speech in the classroom. 2 1 Dean
Cohen was a tenured professor at a community college in California. 122 A student
complained about his frequent use of profanity and sexually vulgar speech in a
remedial writing class.123 The college's Grievance Committee found that Cohen
had violated the school's new sexual harassment policy, which defined sexual
harassment as, inter alia, "verbal ...conduct ...[that] has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's academic performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive learning environment. ' 124 The president and
board of trustees, after an additional hearing, found Cohen had violated the policy
and ordered him to publish a syllabus of his class describing his teaching style and
content for prospective students and ordered him to attend a sexual harassment
125
seminar.

118.

Id.
at 79.

119.

Id.

120. Id. at 80.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 969
Id. at 970.
Id. at971.
Id.at 971.
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Cohen sued, and the district court denied him relief.' 26 The Ninth Circuit,
however, held that the policy was unconstitutionally vague and remanded for an
injunction against the college. 127 The court invoked the familiar nostrum that
"statutes regulating First Amendment activities must be narrowly drawn to address
only the evil at hand,' 1 28 and concluded that Cohen had been the victim of a
"legalistic ambush," because "officials of the College, on an entirely ad hoc basis,
applied the Policy's nebulous outer reaches to punish teaching methods that Cohen
had used for many years."'1 29 The court plainly was concerned that Cohen would
not have known that his teaching methods of many years were now unacceptable.
The case might well present an instance where the college failed to provide
sufficient education to faculty about when unusual teaching techniques invade the
rights of students; the published court of appeals opinion does not indicate how
that issue was addressed by either the trial court or by the college hearing bodies.
Still, it hardly seems surprising that the quoted language would embrace persistent
irrelevant sexual comments in a classroom. 130 Moreover, the court gave no weight
to the interest of the college in protecting the student complainant from language
that led her to drop the class nor to the role of the college bodies in articulating and
specifying how to accommodate the competing interests in a case where the
teacher received essentially a warning.131
Critics of "political correctness" present Silva and Cohen as victims, college
and university officials as enforcers of mindless leftist orthodoxy, and the judges
as heroic defenders of freedom. 132 Allen Kors and Harvey Silverglate, authors of
126. Id. at 970.
127. Id. at 973.
128. Id. at 972. The Court's language and citations signal its overall failure to distinguish
between speech "statutes" enforced by the police and school regulations concerning internal
academic speech. The court does quote from a case addressing university discipline of a professor
for leading a disruptive demonstration against the killings at Kent State in 1970, but neglects to
note that the Ninth Circuit in that case vacated the trial court's ruling that the university's rules
restricting the professor's manner of protesting were vague or overbroad. See id. at 972, noting
Adamian v. Jacobson, 523 F.2d 929, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1975). In any event, university regulation
of ordinary speech can be analyzed more comfortably under general First Amendment approaches
than can teaching.
129. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972.
130. The AAUP defines sexual harassment that may subject a teacher to discipline to include
speech that is:
reasonably regarded as offensive and substantially impairs the academic
opportunity of students ....
If it takes place in the teaching context, it must also be
persistent, pervasive, and not germane to the subject matter. The academic setting is
distinct from the workplace in that wide latitude is recognized for professional
judgment in determining the appropriate content and presentation of academic
material.
AAUP, Sexual Harassment: Suggested Policy and Procedures for Handling Complaints,
available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/rbsexha.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
Although this statement appropriately provides more protection to academic freedom than do the
standards in either Silva or Cohen, either of those professors might have been successfully
prosecuted under the AAUP standard.
131.
Cohen, 92 F.3d at 968.
132. Of course, dismissed professors sometimes claim to have been penalized for their liberal
orthodoxy. See Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (W.D. Va. 1996) (finding that
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what is generally considered the best popular attack on academic speech
restrictions, describe Judge Devine's clumsy opinion in Silva as a deep exploration
of the First Amendment that chastises "all who have tolerated verbal conduct bans
at almost all our colleges and universities." 133 They also remark, "the gap between
[these] two decisions [by the university and by Judge Devine] is the gap that now
passes for academic justice and the decent rule of law." 134 They praise the Cohen
court because it "understood not only academic freedom better than the college,
but also pedagogy ....-135 Professor Neil Hamilton places Silva among his
pantheon of victims of leftist orthodoxy, the suffering of which he places on par
with those who lost their jobs during the McCarthy period. 136 Yet, while one
might think that the administrators used a heavy hand, it is difficult to see that
Silva's speech had political content or that barring such speech would need to
hinder debate on any academic topics of significance.
The opinions discussed in this section share common virtues and vices. For
virtues, the courts are seeking to preserve freedom in teaching against what they
perceive to be intolerance. Levin does address an administrative assault on a
professor for considered views presented in appropriate scholarly and public
means. The others hardly involve attempts to stifle the exposition of ideas. They
represent attempts by schools, however flawed, to accommodate legitimate
concerns by female students about professors injecting alienating sexual references
in class. That is their duty. It is striking that both cases involve low-level writing
classes in two-year institutions. The female students complaining were older
students pursuing practical education, not feminist theorists itching for a fight.
These cases are not about ideology; they are about appropriate teaching and the
respective authority of school and professor. As such, the solution cannot be found
by mechanical citations to general free speech cases, but by careful consideration
of the process and participants in internal decision making. Both schools in these
sexy teaching cases should have done better on that score, but it is not a basis to
lay down broad constitutional principles that deny schools the authority to make
educational policy. These opinions do more than analyze professorial speech
under general doctrines of the First Amendment rather than under academic
freedom. 137 They transfer authority over internal disputes about teaching from the
schools to the courts. To that extent, they threaten academic freedom more than
protect it.138
plaintiff disrupted business school curriculum by discussing diversity at length in class).
133. KORS & SILVERGLATE, supra note 15, at 119.
134. Id. at 120.
135. Id.at 116.
136. HAMILTON, supra note 99, at 82-83.
137. Some cases, of course, do find for universities and emphasize the need for deference to
academic decision making. However, they also are unsatisfactory because they justify deference
only on practical terms, such as the relative expertise ofjudges and educators or the need to avoid
"disruption," rather than on values of academic freedom. See, e.g., Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F.
Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996). One reason for this seems to be the failure of universities themselves
to argue for their constitutional interests. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823 (6th Cir.
2001) (finding that college was not "claiming an interest in academic freedom per se in support of
its position").
138. Not long ago, Temple University fired a tenured professor for incompetence, following
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B. Students Disciplined For Offensive Speech
Reacting to concerns about racially charged incidents among students, some
universities adopted "hate speech" codes beginning in the middle and late
1980s. 139 Although these varied in their terms, they typically subjected to
discipline students that verbally insulted another individual student based on that
student's race or ethnicity. Most contained some principle to further narrow their
reach to words likely to cause violence or to create a "hostile" educational
environment. 140 Many of these codes were drafted with the assistance of wellregarded law professors. Scholarly articles supporting such codes formed an early
crest for the critical race studies movement in legal academe. 14 1 Debate about their
propriety became a national obsession. Yet every speech code challenged in a
reported decision was struck down as violating the First Amendment or a
42
complementary state constitutional provision.
The conflict in values in these cases raises fundamental questions about the role
of the institution in setting ground rules for extracurricular speech. College and
university policies regarding student curricular speech receive wide deference, and
even expulsions, when resting on academic grounds, are largely insulated by
institutional academic freedom.' 4 3 In the not-too-distant past, colleges and
universities had nearly the same control over extracurricular speech. 144 The
recognition of student free speech rights has a complicated provenance growing
out of the student protests in the 1960s; courts seemed to want to honor the
students' political expressions, lest they reject the practices of liberal democracy
for violent disruption. 145 Student free speech rights against universities reflect
political values rather than academic ones. They are an appropriate evolution,
consonant with modem educational assumptions and the constitutionally
recognized political maturity of modem students.

a hearing by a faculty committee, on the grounds that he was persistently unsuccessful in teaching
a basic mathematics course and was negligent about the needs of his students. See Robin Wilson,
The Teaching Equation That Didn't Add Up, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 29, 2002, at A 10.
The professor is suing Temple claiming that the judgment about his teaching violates the First
Amendment. Id.
139. See Byrne, supra note 60, at 401-02.
140. Id. at 412-15.
141. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133 (1982). These articles combined outrage about racism with an epistemological and
sociological challenge to notions of the neutrality of free speech. The broader conflict signaled by
this fundamental challenge is discussed below. For a feminist perspective, see Mary Becker,
Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Casefor Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975
(1993). There are remarkably few articles taking the view that such speech regulation is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 244-50 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
143. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985).
144. See Byrne, supra note 60, at 427-28.
145. See ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 61-64 (1968).

2004]

CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

But the courts have not seriously analyzed how student political speech should
reflect standards appropriate to an institution of higher learning. In Healy v.
James,146 the Supreme Court held that a college could not ban a student Students
for a Democratic Society chapter because it disagreed with its political viewpoint,
but could require the organization's leaders to agree to follow reasonable rules of
conduct designed to protect the educational environment. 147 Justice Stevens, in his
concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent,148 affirmed that university officials
appropriately make pervasive decisions on educational grounds concerning the
content of speech both within and without the curriculum, 149 but this view has
never earned clear endorsement by the Court. 150 Rather, the Court has sometimes
denied the college or university any greater say over the standards for student
extracurricular speech than the state has over the political speech of citizens-in
one case using Cohen to find unconstitutional a university penalizing a graduate
51
student for using profanity in a publication distributed on campus.'
Quite apart from the wisdom or utility of speech codes or the constitutionality
of any one of them, court rejection of all litigated speech codes represents a
significant loss for institutional academic freedom. These cases frustrate a
considered endeavor to enhance the educational environment that, even if
incorrect, should have been left to institutional authorities, when they could show
that the restrictions advanced valid educational goals rather than simply prohibiting
articulation of a viewpoint. The opinions displace academic norms by the civic
norms of the First Amendment. Most egregiously, they utterly fail to acknowledge
that the college or university stands in a different relation to the speech of its
52
students than the government does to the speech of citizens generally.1

146. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
147. Id. at 170.
148. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
149. Id. at 278-279 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote:
Because every university's resources are limited, an educational institution must
routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for
extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those
decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it
obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a
particular time-one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an
amateur performance of Hamlet-the First Amendment would not require that the
room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a
university should have to establish a "compelling state interest" to defend its decision
to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university
should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of
Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material
adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of this kind should be made by
academicians, not by federal judges, and their standards for decision should not be
encumbered with ambiguous phrases like "compelling state interest."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
150. See also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236-43
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
151. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670-71(1973) (per curiam).
152. See Byrne, supra note 60, at 399-400. Robert Post has recently written insightfully
about how the claim arose in the Berkeley free speech movement that the university should have
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The best reasoned of these decisions struck down one of the most carefully
drafted speech codes, that of the University of Wisconsin. 153 The "UW Rule," as it
is referred to in the decision, drafted by university counsel with the help of three
law professors, was adopted by the board of regents in response to concern about
specific racist incidents and after substantial public comment. 154 The UW Rule
prohibited:
[R]acist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive
behavior directed at an individual . . . if such comments . . .
intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or
individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
education, university related work, or other university-authorized

activity. 155

The drafters sought to fit the Code within the Supreme Court's narrow
exception to its First Amendment rule prohibiting content-based regulation of
speech. The "fighting words" exception as it has persisted (barely) permits
government to prohibit face to face insults that are likely to lead to an immediate
violent reaction. 156 The problem for the drafters was that they were not primarily
concerned about violence, but with the intimidation and marginalization of the
abused. 157 Accordingly, the limiting principle of the rule is when the insult creates
"an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education."' 158 So
anchoring the restriction might borrow legitimacy from Title VII cases recognizing
that an employer can be guilty of discrimination for permitting employee epithets
that create a hostile work environment. 159 The UW Rule was narrower than Title
160
VII in that it required a specific intent to create a hostile environment.
no "specific interests in the regulation of communication and of its content that are distinct from
those of the public at large." Robert Post, Constitutionally Interpretingthe FSM Controversy, in
THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: REFLECTIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960S 413 (Robert Cohen

and Reginald E. Zelnick eds., 2002). He views it as a claim directed at local concerns rather than
one having deep normative appeal or staying power.
153. See UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).
154. The considerations that went into the rule are described by Patricia B. Hodulik, a lawyer
for the university, in ProhibitingDiscriminatory Harassment by Regulating Student Speech: A
Balancing ofFirstAmendment and University Interests,16 J.C. & U.L. 573 (1990).
155. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 17.06(2) (1989) (quoted in UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1165-66).
156. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
157. See Byrne, supranote 60, at 413-15.
158. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 17.06(2) (1989) (quoted in UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 11651166).
159. See Byrne, supra note 60, at 413. See generally, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN'T
SAY THAT!: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 23-

24 (2003).
160. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 17.06(2)(a)(2) (1989) (quoted in UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at
1165-66).
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Explanatory examples enacted as part of the rule made it clear that students would
not violate the rule by politely expressing derogatory opinions of protected
groups. 161
The court invalidated the rule because it failed to meet the requirements of the
fighting words exception as articulated by the Supreme Court. 162 The court noted
that the First Amendment does not permit government to ban speech because it
lacks intellectual content or "is unlikely to form any part of a dialogue or exchange
of views and because it does not provide an opportunity for a reply."' 163 The court
further held that any inequality visited on students by being subject to epithets does
not constitute state action and any impairment of education for targeted students
could not be regulated by content-based speech restrictions. 164 The court gave no
weight to the university's role in creating an environment conducive to fruitful
education or its expertise in evaluating the quality of speech.
The courts' rejection of student speech codes became nearly insurmountable
after the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul,165 in which the
Court held that government prohibition of racist expression, in that case burning a
cross on the lawn of a black family, violates the First Amendment even if the
speech falls within a category of unprotected expressions, like fighting words,
when it singles out one viewpoint. 166 The effects of this can be seen in the Fourth
Circuit's decision finding a First Amendment violation in George Mason
University's suspending social events at a fraternity for racially offensive
portrayals of black females at an "ugly women contest." 167 The court both found
that the portrayal had expressive value, and that the university, in any event, had
sanctioned the fraternity's performance "because it ran counter to the views the
university sought to communicate to its students," that is, that racism and sexism
have no place in higher education.' 68 The court acknowledged that the university
has "the responsibility, even the obligation" to provide a learning atmosphere free
from racism and sexism, but could not pursue these goals through "selective
limitations upon speech."' 169 Judge Mumaghan disagreed with the majority at this
point, arguing that "a university must be allowed to regulate expressive conduct
which runs directly counter to its mission.i 17° Murnaghan's is the only published
judicial opinion in an offensive speech case to recognize that a college or
university stands in a different relationship to student speech than do the police

161. UMWPost,774F. Supp.at 1175.
162. Id. at 1173.
163. Id. at 1175.
164. Id. at 1176. The court rejected all arguments that the UW Rule was unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 1178-81.
165. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
166. Id.at 377.
167. See Iota Sigma Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386,
393 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that coach's use of derogatory word was not protected by academic freedom but that
university's discriminatory harassment policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
168. Sigma Chi Fraternity,993 F.2d at 393.
169. Id. (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 392).
170. Id.at 395.
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because of its educational goals. 171
While government at large may have too much coercive power but not the
moral authority or expertise to be trusted with setting a minimum for personal
expression, the college or university exists to create structures for promoting
fruitful speech. That seems to me why the First Amendment would prohibit
"governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university" and protect
academic decision making at all. 1 72 The selection of teachers and students, the
organization of the curriculum, and the setting of intellectual standards for
discourse exist to enhance the overall quality of speech in order to promote a
search for truth and to facilitate education. Both faculty and students are required
to meet scholarly and educational standards. The students subject to the UW Rule
go to college because they are relatively ignorant and provincial. Their education
aims to teach them how to think for themselves, but that process requires both
knowledge about the larger world and discipline in how to express ideas. It is
anomalous that a student referring to the Secretary of State in a political science
paper by a racial epithet could be flunked, but the student has a constitutional right
to address a classmate or teacher with the same epithet.
Yet courts recently have had trouble addressing student claims of First
Amendment rights even in a curricular context. The recent remarkable case of
Brown v. Li 173 shows how the absence of a workable standard of academic
freedom threatens erosion of scholarly standards. After Brown's Master's thesis in
Material Science was approved by his thesis committee, he added a scurrilous
"disacknowledgements" section offering "special Fuck You's to the following
degenerates for being an ever-present hindrance during my graduate career,"
naming various academic and political figures, and "Science." 174 The committee
then concluded that the "disacknowledgements" section did not meet professional
standards, that Brown should express his views in other fora, and that he would not
receive his degree until the section was eliminated or rewritten. 175 The university
Academic Freedom Committee rejected Brown's grievance, finding that Brown

171. Even private schools have had speech codes struck down. Stanford's was invalidated
under a California statute giving students at private universities the same free speech rights that
they have against the state. Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Feb. 27, 1995). The statute, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002), provides:
(a) No private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce any rule
subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside the campus or facility of
a private post-secondary institution, is protected from governmental restriction by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article 1 of the
California Constitution.
Obviously, I believe that this is unconstitutional on its face. It seems to me quintessentially "a
governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university." Ironically, a religiously affiliated
university probably could prohibit racist student speech, even in California, because of the free
exercise clause.
172. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
173. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 (2003).
174. Id. at 943.
175. Id. at 943-44.
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had failed to follow reasonable rules for thesis approval. 176 Eventually, the school
relented and awarded Brown his degree but would not place the thesis in the
library.1 77 Brown sued nonetheless, the district court granted the university
defendants summary judgment on the federal claims, and Brown appealed to78the
Ninth Circuit, a divided panel of which affirmed without a majority rationale.1
Judge Graber's opinion eventually reaches an appropriate standard: professors
may hold students to reasonable academic standards. Although a student has some
First Amendment rights even in curricular speech, a court must defer "to the
university's expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students to meet
them." 179 She even inches toward acknowledging that courts must afford this
deference because of the institution's academic freedom. Her opinion suffers,
however, from the doctrinal framework within which she believes she needs to
work. The precedent upon which she relies deals with a high school teacher's
control over a school newspaper produced in a journalism class, 180 and she
struggles to fend off Judge Reinhardt's telling criticism that the scope of a
student's intellectual freedom must be greater in graduate school than in high
181
school.
Judge Graber would have done better to rely directly on academic freedom to
hold that a federal court has no authority to intrude on academic evaluations unless
clearly shown not to have been based on reasonable academic standards. Lesser
protection for articulation and application of academic standards would threaten
disciplinary integrity. Students also should enjoy academic freedom within their
schoolwork, which means that their work can be evaluated only by those
competent to do so and on appropriate academic standards. One can imagine cases
in which a student was flunked in bad faith for personal animus or political
prejudice.1 82 However, here Brown had access to an academic review board,
which specifically held that his academic freedom was not violated by insistence
183
that he use the acknowledgments section of his thesis in a professional manner.
The decision of an appropriately constituted body following reasonable procedures
should be conclusive. In any event, the complaining student should carry the
burden of proving that the decision was not based on academic grounds.
Judge Reinhardt's dissent entirely disregards academic freedom and puts the
176. Id. at 945.
177. Id.
178. Judge Ferguson concurred in the result on the ground that Brown was being punished
only for dishonesty, which raised no First Amendment issue. Id. at 955-956 (Ferguson, J.,
concurring).
179. Id. at952.
180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (holding that high school
newspaper published by students did not qualify as a public forum, so high school officials
retained the right to impose reasonable restrictions on student speech).
181. Thus, I have no problem with a recent conclusion that Kuhlmeier does not apply to a
university's efforts to regulate the yearbook. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
182. Judge Graber no doubt is correct in saying that a teacher may require a student to write
a paper from a particular point of view as an exercise, but it would be quite a different thing for a
professor to penalize a student's paper because she disagrees with the political viewpoint implicit
in the student's work. Brown, 308 F.3d at 953.
183. Id.at 945.
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federal courts in the center of settling the propriety of enforcement of particular
He rejects the distinction between curricular and
academic standards.' 84
extracurricular speech and explores a variety of criteria for assessing college and
university limitations of speech in a variety of contexts that portend not only
unending regulation of grading and seminar moderation, but the wholesale
displacement of academic norms by civic norms. 185 He would have put the
university to the burden of showing that its refusal to approve the
"disacknowledgments" section was "substantially related to an important
pedagogic purpose. ' 186 Thus, the university can refuse to approve any thesis (or
presumably award a low grade for any student paper or examination) only if it
proves to a judge not only that its action has a pedagogic purpose, but that the
purpose is "important" and that the action taken has a sufficiently close fit to the
purpose such that the judge will conclude that the action "substantially advances"
the purpose. 187 Although the cost of defending the millions of such professional
judgments to a non-academic would be appalling, much worse is the sapping of
authority essential to carrying on the academic enterprise. This is a legal line that
colleges and universities cannot permit to be breached.
The speech code cases cry out for a careful consideration of a state university's
authority to set minimum standards for civilized extracurricular but intramural
speech. My view has been that a college or university should be able to prohibit
racial insults, but not the expression of any view (however offensive) that can be
replied to reasonably:
A university should be able to prohibit racial insults because they are
inconsistent with the rational search for truth, substitute rancor and
ranting for evidence and argument, destroy the mutual courtesy that
embodies respect for a reasonable adversary, and divert the victim of
such [insult] from the intellectual work that the university provides
her. 188
This seems consistent with the view expressed by the Supreme Court recently that
students have a right not have their activity fees used to promote political causes
with which they disagree, but that this right can be overborne by the educational
purpose of the program.189
Not only did the courts ignore the different speech roles of the institution and
the government at large, but the attempt to implement speech codes called forth
unprecedented, sustained, and vitriolic attacks on institutions for abandoning
freedom of thought and expression in favor of some leftist orthodoxy. Some
exercises of claimed power to punish speech clearly merited condemnation for
insensitivity, incompetence, and even maliciousness. But often, it was in the
interests of those who took up the cry of political correctness to magnify and
generalize these failings. I take up these complex matters of characterization and
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 962-63.
Id. at 956-57 (Reinhart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 964 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
Id.
Byrne, supra note 60, at 440.
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofWisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000).
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publicity below, but the speech codes in practice generated anger and
disparagement that probably exceeded the good they did. Many were repealed and
few are invoked today. Fortunately, the improved racial climate on most campuses
a decade later makes them often a moot point. What remains are precedents
rejecting without serious consideration the authority of colleges and universities to
set standards of discourse in extracurricular affairs.
There is an intriguing coda to consideration of speech codes. In Southworth v.
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin,190 the Supreme Court upheld
using mandatory student activity fees to fund student advocacy having educational
benefit against a claim that such a fee violates the First Amendment right of a
student not to have his money used to promote ideas with which he disagrees. 19'
The Court concluded that the university's educational interest in promoting speech
by its students outweighed infringement of the plaintiff student's valid interest in
not supporting speech with which he disagreed, so long as the university followed
a strict "viewpoint neutrality" in the allocation of collected funds. 192 Certainly, the
decision, which was unanimous, was an important win for colleges and
universities, indicating that educational purposes can outweigh recognized First
Amendment interests in the extracurriculum, but there are a few disquieting
aspects to the Court's opinions.
Justice Kennedy repeatedly hammers the point that the institution must not
prefer some "viewpoints" to others for the program to be sustained. "Viewpoint
neutrality is the justification for requiring the student to pay the fee in the first
place and for ensuring the integrity of the program's operation once the funds have
been collected."' 193 It is not clear how far this principle extends. Could the
university prefer the Latin club to the book burning club? The issue was not
explored because the parties stipulated that the program was administered in a
viewpoint-neutral manner.1 94 As a result, the Court did not need to mandate that
such programs be viewpoint neutral.' 9 5 However, thinking of the speech code
cases, the court may have wanted to state generally that any limitation of student
speech cannot favor a particular view.
A clue to this is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Souter, which takes
pains to place the case in the context of institutional academic freedom, even
quoting the four freedoms. He notes:
While we have spoken in terms of a wide protection for the academic
freedom and autonomy that bars legislatures (and Courts) from
imposing conditions on the spectrum of subjects taught and viewpoints
expressed in college teaching (as the majority recognizes), we have
never held that universities lie entirely beyond the reach of students'
96
First Amendment rights. 1

190.

529 U.S. 217 (2000).

191.

Id. at 233

192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 233.

194.

Id. at 234.

195.

Id.

196.

Id. at 238-39 (Souter, J., concurring).
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His point is that the university's responsibility for making choices about speech
values should be weighed in considering the scope of any interest the student
might be found to have. But after the quoted language comes a footnote: "Indeed,
acceptance of the most general statement of academic freedom (as in the South
African statement quoted by Justice Frankfurter) might be thought even to sanction
1 97
student speech codes in public universities."
It is extraordinary to encounter this charming dicta in such a place. This is just
the consideration so absent from the speech code cases themselves. Justice
Souter's reference suggests that he has not closed his mind on the topic, but his use
of the word "even" suggests his awareness of the fact that the claim is unthinkable
to some members of the majority. One cannot help supposing that the matter was
discussed at conference.
C. Faculty as Government Mouthpieces
Faculty at state universities are state employees, of course; indeed their acts
constitute state action giving rise to constitutional claims against them. Yet
historically, the AAUP approach to academic freedom drew no distinction between
faculty at public and at private institutions; both need the professional autonomy
necessary for scholarship and teaching. As we saw above, teaching at a state
institution can even expand professors' rights by giving them First Amendment
claims against their institution. Moreover, professors at state universities have
enjoyed protection against penalty for nonacademic speech on matters of public
198
concern under doctrines encompassing all public employees.
For years courts have analyzed regulation of professors' classroom or other
academic speech under doctrine established either concerning public employee
speech generally or the authority of high schools to regulate student speech. The
first line of cases grant state university professors limited protection against
dismissal when their speech touches on matters of "public concern." 199 The core
case is one in which a public school teacher writes a letter to the newspaper
criticizing the conduct of his department. If the topic written about is a matter of
"public concern," then the court balances the value of the communication against
the interests of the employer in avoiding "disruption" of its work. 20 0 Application
of this test-however well it works in general 2° 1 -to classroom speech begs all

197. Id. at 239 n.5.
198. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). There is a long debate about the
extent to which a professor's nonacademic speech merits protection as a matter of academic
freedom. See William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (Edmund L. Picoffs ed.,
1975).
199. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
200. In Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994), the Court held that the government
employer's acting upon a reasonable belief that the speech would cause disruption is enough to
satisfy the First Amendment.
201. A recent careful examination found that, because the meaning of public concern is so
unclear, lower court decisions "often yield contradictory results that strip the public concern
prong of all predictability and leave both public employers and public employees uncertain of
their rights." Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better
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the important questions implicated by academic freedom. 202 First, the importance
of academic speech cannot be assessed under the rubric of "public concern."
Teaching and scholarship are part of a process of speech of great social
importance, but any single instance may seem removed indeed from the concerns
of the public. Not surprisingly, some cases hold that classroom speech nearly
always is a matter of public concern, 203 others come close to holding that it never
is,204 but most involve ad hoc judgment about whether the statement was
educationally appropriate, quite a different matter than whether it was of public
concern. 205 Second, the emphasis on the employer's concern about disruption and
efficiency seems out of place in assessing the relation between professor and
school, where governance is more collegial than hierarchical, and conformity of
expression antithetical. 206
Several courts prefer the test derived from Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,20 7 which upheld a high school's regulation of the student newspaper
produced in a journalism class, because such regulation was "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concern. 208 This test at least addresses the state's interest
as educator, while the Pickering approach does not.209 Moreover, it directs
attention to whether the school based its decision on academic grounds, the
touchstone for institutional academic freedom. However, the rationale of
Kuhlmeier invokes interests that have no place in weighing the scope of a
professor's classroom speech rights, such as the immaturity of high school
students, the school's duty to instill values in them, and the risk of attribution of
school newspaper views to school authorities. 210 As in the public employee
doctrine cases, courts applying this test must reach outside it to articulate the

Definition ofthe Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REv. 993, 1008 (1997).
202. See Ailsa Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic
Freedom: A Searchfor a Better Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REv. 915
(2001).
203. See, e.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
that "classroom instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court's broad definition of 'public
concern').
204. See, e.g., Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1443 (C.D. Ill. 1996) ("Course content
is not a matter of public concern.").
205. This can be seen in comparing two cases where professors were dismissed essentially
for using the word "nigger." In Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995), the
head basketball coach's dismissal for using the epithet in a locker room talk to his players was
upheld, the court stating: "The University has a right to disapprove of the use of the word... as a
motivational tool ....
Accord Gee v. Humphries, No. 95-4003 1-RH (N.D. Fla. 1996). In Hardy,
260 F.3d at 679, the court found the use of the word "germane to the subject matter" being taught.
206. Chris Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public University, 27 J.C. & U.L.
669, 706 (2001). While Hoofnagle correctly points out that intellectual freedom should not be
balanced against potential disruption, he does not acknowledge that the university has other
interests in limiting speech that flows from its educational mission. Id.
207. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
208. Id. at 273.
209. Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11 th Cir. 1991). See Rubin, 933 F. Supp. at
1425. See also Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 914-15 (10th Cir. 2000)
(discussing educational interests and pedagogical concerns).
210. See Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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values at stake in classroom speech cases.
The relation between state universities and their professors was placed in a new
light by the decision in Rust v. Sullivan,2 11 generally enhancing control by the
government over the speech of its employees. The Court signaled that state
university professors require special protection from government control:
[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of
conditions attached to expenditure of government funds is restricted by
212
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.
While this was a welcome recognition, it did affirm that professors are state
employees who fall within the Rust principle to some extent. It also failed to use
the words "academic freedom."
In Southworth, discussed above, the Court again indicated that its First
Amendment analysis of the university's "viewpoint neutral" student extracurricular
speech program would not provide a framework for analyzing curricular speech
issues.
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the
University, its agents or employees, or-of particular importance-its
faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls in
this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name through
its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse
2 13
faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.
The Court cited Rust, but only generally and not to the quote given above
directed at academic freedom. The Court then characterized the speech in
'214
Southworth as "not that of the University or its agents.
Again, the Court acted appropriately in making clear the limits of its ruling.
But the language used, however casually chosen, raises alarm. It runs counter to
all notions of academic freedom to suggest that the university speaks through its
faculty or that faculty speak as agents of the university. The Court recognized that
the faculty do not speak in the "name" of the university. But the opinion gives as
the starting point for analysis of speech by professors that they are employees or
agents of the government. 215 Moreover, it does not distinguish between regulations
of speech formulated by the state or by the university itself This approach has a
capacity for mischief.
One might well dismiss such concerns as overheated concerns of a Supreme
Court Kremlinologist, were it not for the subsequent en banc decision of the Fourth
Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore.216 This is certainly the worst academic freedom

211. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
212. Id. at 200 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603,
605-06 (1967)).
213. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v.Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234-35.
214. Id. at 235.
215. Id.
216. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
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decision since the notorious Bertrand Russell case in 1940.217 The court upheld a
Virginia statute that prohibits any state employee from viewing "sexually explicit
content" on computers owned or leased by the state. 2 18 The statute was challenged
by a group of professors at public universities in Virginia, who argued that it
violated their constitutional right to academic freedom, at least when they viewed
such material for professional research. 2 19 Not only did the court reject the explicit
claim and uphold the ban, but it broadly denied that professors have any
constitutional right of academic freedom and reasoned that the state had as much
right to control the teaching, research, and scholarship of professors at state
universities as it did the pleadings of a state lawyer or the reports of state
bureaucrats. 220 Citing Rust, the court claimed that the state has nearly complete
control over the professional speech of its employees, including professors, when
the speech is part of the employees' duties. 22 1 The court stated that "the
government is entitled to control the content of the speech because it has, in a
meaningful sense, purchased the speech at issue through a grant of funding or
'222
payment of a salary.
Despite the relative inconsequence of the restrictions themselves, the court's
reasoning broadly withdraws constitutional protection against government
interference for a core scholarly activity of professors-research. 223 Nothing in the
reasoning distinguishes computers from state libraries, including those at state
universities, nor does it distinguish the sexually explicit material at issue from
other pictures, books, or electronic media. Finally, the broad rationale that the
state owns and may dictate the professional speech of professors at state
universities, just as fully as it does the information given out by a clerk at the
department of motor vehicles, could justify the state insisting on the topics and
even opinions that a professor may express in class or in scholarship. While it is
incredible that a state would push or a federal court would permit matters to reach
such a state of political ventriloquism, the court's broad endorsement of control
and censorship suggests no principle that would prevent it.
The court acknowledged that the statute would violate the norms of academic
freedom developed by the AAUP. 224 But, citing me, it held that the Constitution
does not protect individual academic freedom, but only that of the university
itself.225

The university's constitutional interest was satisfied by the statutory

provisions permitting "supervisors" to provide waivers for bona fide research

217. See Byme, Scholarship and Court, supra note 21, at B13; supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
218. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1999)).
219. Id. at 406.
220. Id. at 415.
221. Id. at 407-08.
222. Id. at 408.
223. Interestingly, the court could not use general First Amendment doctrine to focus the
professor's rights, as in Silva or Cohen, because free speech generally does not deal with research
or access to information. This is another instance in which the values and procedures of academic
freedom are more protective of intellectual liberty than First Amendment law at large.
224. Urofsky,216F.3dat410-11.
225. Id. at 410 (citing Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 253).
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projects. 226
There are at least two glaring errors in the court's opinion. First, it ignores the
fact that the statute at issue, passed by the state legislature, does regulate the
university itself, as well as professors. The case does not involve internal disputes
about educational or scholarly standards, but the very type of "governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university" that the Supreme Court
repeatedly has condemned and that is referred to in Rust itself.227 Although deans
may grant waivers to individuals, the law significantly changes the power relation
between faculty and administrators in the core academic activities of research and
teaching. Professors will be deterred from investigating sources within the banned
category by red tape and embarrassment. The statute at issue empowers the
administrators to determine what constitutes "bona fide" research; 228 such
questions should be addressed only by peers in the process of professional
evaluation. Moreover, the dean implementing a state statute may have quite
Justice
different bureaucratic concerns than in a strictly academic issue.
Frankfurter warned against the varieties of governmental intrusion in Sweezy: "It
matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that
inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so
fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor. '229 The Urofsky court
missed an important point in stating that administrators should not be presumed to
abuse their discretion: the state should not give them the power to do so and should
not restructure core power relations for its own ends.
Second, the court should have made room for academic freedom in shaping its
Pickering analysis. 230 The court sought to reconcile the interests of the
government as employer with those of the employee in speaking freely by drawing
a bright line between speech on the job, which the First Amendment does not
protect, and speech off the job on matters of public concern, which will be
protected. But the whole justification for academic freedom is that the
professional speech of professors does concern the public. While the school
administrators have a valid interest in the quality of that speech, they have none in
its political drift. Urofsky vividly illustrates the disasters that can flow from
assessing college and university speech issues without sensitivity for academic
values and the tradition of academic freedom. 23 1 The First Amendment has no
concern for intellectual quality.

226. Id. at 405.
227. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring).
228. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404-05.
229. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.
230. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 405-07 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
231. A student author noted that the court's approach protects a low-level state employee
pursuing research in her spare time, while denying it to a professor with a valuable expertise.
Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1414 (2001).
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D. Affirmative Action in Student Admissions
As noted above, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 232 served as a lynchpin for
applying the concept of institutional academic freedom to college and university
policy-making. Justice Powell indicated that Harvard's approach to using race in
admissions was constitutionally permissible, notwithstanding any applicant's
interests in being considered without regard to race, because a college or university
could conclude that creating a diverse student body would enhance education for
all, and race is one among several factors that can legitimately contribute to
educational diversity. 233 This judgment deserved constitutional deference because
deciding on academic grounds who may be admitted to study, is among the
protected freedoms of a college or university. Justice Powell expressly connected
racial diversity in the student body with the values of academic freedom praised in
Sweezy: "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation,'-so essential
to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
'2 34
student body.
The judicial examinations of racial preferences in admissions within the past
decade, before Grutter v. Bollinger, slighted the constitutional values served by
admissions decisions being made by colleges and universities on academic grounds
rather than by courts. The court in Hopwood v. Texas 235 held that the University of
236
Texas School of Law could not use race as a factor in admitting students.
Concerning the Powell approach in Bakke, the court held that the Supreme Court
had rejected diversity as a permissible justification in subsequent cases and that, in
the court's opinion, ethnic diversity in the student body did not promote
intellectual diversity. 237 This misses the point. Justice Powell did not conclude
himself that racial diversity was a compelling educational value but found that well
regarded universities reasonably believed so on academic grounds. 238 The
university's policy was entitled to deference and constitutional weight because of
academic freedom.
Thus, Hopwood and similar decisions diminished academic freedom on a
formerly recognized point. 239 It is frustrating that they do not explain why the

232. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 312 (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
235. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 944-45. See also Grutter v. Univ. of Mich., 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847-49 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) ("Therefore, this court concludes that Bakke does not stand for the proposition that a
university's desire to assemble a racially diverse student body is a compelling state interest.").
238. Justice Powell did believe that racial diversity furthered educational goals. He once
explained this to me by describing how much the Court's deliberations about issues of racial
justice benefited from the presence of Justice Marshall, who impressed Powell with his accounts
of the realities under which African Americans lived. This does not conflict with the judgment of
Justice Powell's biographer that Powell embraced educational diversity because it provided a
workable outcome. "Diversity seemed to offer a way to reject rigid quotas without banning racial
preferences." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 476 (1994).

239. Courts debated what weight to afford Justice Powell's sole, but controlling Bakke
opinion until Grutter rendered the question moot.
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university should not receive deference in this area. Judge Smith acknowledged in
Hopwood that Powell justified his views by the First Amendment, but rejected its
applicability to state universities. 240 "The First Amendment generally protects
citizens from the actions of government, not government from its citizens. '241 He
then asserts that Sweezy sought to protect only "the First Amendment rights of
individual scholars. '242 Judge Smith utterly failed to show even awareness of the
several Supreme Court opinions after Bakke where the Court had affirmed that
state universities enjoy some degree of institutional academic freedom. 243 Rather,
the Fifth Circuit depended on subsequent Supreme Court affirmative action cases
to depart from Justice Powell's more lenient view about what was permissible,
while ignoring subsequent cases confirming that academic freedom has an
institutional component. 244 Decisions upholding the use of race to achieve a
diverse student body similarly failed to embrace the foundations of academic
245
freedom.
While one can readily understand why opponents of using race as a factor in
college and university admissions would ignore the constitutional basis for

240. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943-44.
241. Id. at 943 n.25.
242. Id.
243. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985).
244. The grounding of Bakke in institutional academic freedom also was mishandled in
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (1 1th Cir. 2001). Although in that
case, the court did not reach the issue of whether diversity was a compelling state interest because
it found the university's admission process not to be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal, its
statement of the diversity rationale misses the point:
It is possible that the important purposes of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with university environment-recognized
in other decisions by the Court-may on a powerful record justify treating student
body diversity as a compelling interest. The weight of recent precedent is undeniably to
the contrary, however.
Id. at 1250-51 (internal citations omitted).
The court's reference to "expansive freedoms of speech and thought" of a university
seem to refer to institutional academic freedom, although the court seems reluctant to be explicit.
Id. at 1250. Indeed, it never acknowledges that these freedoms are constitutionally protected. For
these freedoms, it cites inapposite elementary school cases having nothing to do with diversity or
academic freedom. Id. at 1250 n.16, More ominously, the court's reservations about a "powerful
record" and "possible" deference make it plain that it viewed the courts-not the universities-as
the bodies who should make the judgments about the educational value of diversity. This stands
Bakke on its head.
245. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the
Sixth Circuit followed the Powell opinion in Bakke both in concluding that diversity is a
compelling interest and in finding a similar admissions system narrowly tailored. 288 F.3d at
738-39, 744-45. Nonetheless, the court never mentioned academic freedom. While it did state
that "some degree of deference must be accorded to the educational judgment of the Law
School," Id. at 751, it does not acknowledge that the deference is constitutionally required. It
does cite Ewing, but only for the need for deference, leaving the mistaken sense that this
deference is pragmatic, based on relative competence, rather than principle, based on academic
freedom. Id. at 751. Similarly, in Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1197-98
(9th Cir. 2000), the court affirmed that pursuit of a diverse student body was a permissible goal
for an institution of higher learning, but never mentioned that reasonable pursuit of the goal was
protected by academic freedom.
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deference to the institution's judgment, the reticence of supporters seems
misguided. How significant race is as a factor in fostering diverse views among an
entering class has been the subject of debate for thirty years. Different reasonable
views are possible. The point of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is that, given
that such a belief is reasonable, a college or university's choice to include race as
an admissions factor among many to create a diverse class is constitutionally
protected. The court's role is only to see that using race in this way rests
246
reasonably on academic grounds.
Unfortunately, the means embraced to further ethnic diversity in jurisdictions
constitutionally forbidden to use race also threaten academic freedom. In the wake
of Hopwood, the Texas legislature passed a statute providing that any person
graduating in the top 10% of her class in a Texas public high school must be
admitted to a state university as a first-time freshman. 247 The idea is that since
Texas public high schools are so segregated in fact by race and class, admitting the
top 10% from every school will promote diversity without drawing any racial
lines. California, forbidden also to consider race in admissions by the
constitutional amendment embodied in Proposition 209,248 has adopted a similar
249
program.
These well-meaning reactions to judicial limits on college and university
selection of students prevent the college or university from selecting at all. To the
extent they apply, they eliminate all ability for the college or university to
determine on academic grounds who may be admitted to study. 250 Do these

246. There is a principled counter to this argument, which I developed to some extent in a
prior article. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 330-39. Institutional academic
freedom extends only to academic matters; there are a range of college and university policies,
touching on what I have termed "democratic values" which are amenable to regulation by
political bodies on the basis of civil norms. Thus, the federal statutes may prohibit race or sex
discrimination in administering college and university programs. Just as Virginia Military
Institute's belief that its education worked better for an all-male student body could be displaced
by the civic commitment against sex discrimination, a racially diverse student body might be
displaced by a strong civic commitment never to use race in government decision making.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198-99
(1990). This would involve overruling Bakke on its specific holding, but would not negate the
existence of academic freedom to shield university decision making in other areas less vital to the
civic order. Grutter concludes that the public consensus against using race is not so strong as to
displace college and university use of it in admissions. It seems plausible that the Constitution
permits some sexually separate but equal programs in higher education. See infra notes 283-284
and accompanying text.
247. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51-803 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (effective Aug. 30, 1999).
248. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §3 1(a) (approved Nov. 5, 1996) (codifying Proposition 209).
249.

See ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAYING

FIELD: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 192-93 (2004).
250. Professor Guinier romanticizes the Texas plan in her thoughtful argument for
emphasizing the "democratic" element in selective college admissions. Lani Guinier, Comment,
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardiansat the Gate of
our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 162-71 (2003). The coalition between liberal,
urban state representatives and conservative rural representatives that she praises as point to a
coalition for reform can be seen more critically as a straightforward redistribution of public goods
to their own constituents. See id. at 162-63. In general, she slights unduly the value of having
various standards and approaches to admissions left primarily in the hands of educators.
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statutes violate academic freedom? This is a difficult question, to which I cannot
dedicate much space here, but my sense is that they do not so long as the
percentage of the entering class admitted under this provision is relatively low.
But should state statutes fill large percentages of a class with mandates, it would
approach a point at which I would conclude that academic freedom had been
251
violated because it would interfere with the educational goals of the institution.
A school must have basic control of its admissions standards to set intellectual and
educational goals.
The mumbling of decisions slighting academic freedom in analyzing admissions
cases makes even more startling the recent blast from the ram's horn. The
Supreme Court's affirmation of the use of race in university admissions to achieve
student body diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger252 represents the most important
victory to date for institutional academic freedom. The Court expressly endorsed
Justice Powell's opinion from Bakke and held that "student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions. '253 Moreover, the "compelling" quality of the university's interest
stems from First Amendment protection for the autonomy of good faith
educational decision making. 254 The Court also found that the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions system was "narrowly tailored" to admit a
255
racially diverse class without indulging quotas or categorical preferences.
The importance of the decision for academic freedom can be understood from
the doctrinal dilemma the decision resolved. The current Court had clearly
embraced the position that all uses of race in government decision making require
justification by a "compelling state interest. '256 The only purpose that had clearly
justified such use of race was the remediation of specific instances of past de jure
racial discrimination, 257 and benign motives, such as addressing the consequences
of societal racial prejudice generally or providing racial role models for elementary
school students, had been rejected as inadequate. 258 As noted above, several courts
of appeal had held that racial diversity in higher education was never a compelling
state interest. Thus, the doctrinal pressure seemed to be against finding diversity in
this context to be a sufficient interest.
The logic of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court required that great weight
be placed upon institutional academic freedom to make the case that student body
251. A state legislature has an obvious interest in the composition of the student body at a
state university. The people contribute substantial tax revenues to make these schools broadly
affordable to promote opportunity for the state's students. But at some point, the legitimate
democratic pursuit of access and mobility can so interfere with core educational and scholarly
values, that legislation concerning admissions and financial aid should be found to violate
constitutional academic freedom. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 332-33.
252. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
253. Id. at 325.
254. Id. at 329.
255. Id. at 307.
256. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
257. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. T.A. Cronson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
258. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 352 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
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racial diversity amounts to a compelling interest. The Court began by stressing its
deference to the law school's judgment that "diversity is essential to its educational
mission." 259 The Court, while stressing that it was engaged in strict scrutiny,
insisted:
Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to university's academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits. We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy
a special niche in our constitutional tradition .... Our conclusion that

the Law School has a compelling state interest in a diverse student body
is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the
heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and its "good
faith" on the part of a university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the
contrary."260
I omit from this long excerpt the Court's quoting of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion
to the effect that choosing students on academic grounds comes within a
university's First Amendment rights. The point is clear: creating a diverse student
body is a compelling state interest because institutional academic freedom requires
deference to the college's or university's judgment that such a class furthers
educational goals.
The opinion, however, also provides bases for arguing against this
interpretation. The Court also apparently made an independent judgment that
diversity in higher education was important. It embraced the views expressed in
amicus curiae briefs by business leaders and military leaders that diversity is
important in business and military command as well, and also stressed the general
social benefits from the educational pathways to power and success being "visibly
open" to people of all races.2 6 1 Such considerations range far from the academic
freedom right to decide on academic grounds who may be admitted to study. To
the extent that the Court formed its own assessment of social interests in mobility
or citizenship, its decision, however important for racial justice, would not enhance
institutional academic freedom. But the Court presented the social considerations
262
only as having "further bolstered" the law school's educational arguments.
Primary stress lay on academic freedom. And the Court expressly adopted the
rationale of Justice Powell in Bakke, 263 whose embrace of academic freedom is
more enthusiastic, and wove Powell's words through the heart of its opinion.
259. Grutter.539 U.S. at 328.
260. Id. at 328-329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (internal citations
omitted)).
261. Id. at 332.
262. Id. at 330.
263. Although one must pause on how the Grutter court described "Powell's view that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions." Id. at 325. The description omits reference to academic freedom. The Court also
refers to "our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits." Id. at 328. The Court avoided giving a ringing endorsement in
its words to constitutional autonomy in principle.
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Future litigants will be able to quote or cite Powell in Bakke with as much force as
O'Connor in Grutter. Still, one cannot imagine the Court deferring to educational
policies it found absurd or repellant.
The importance of academic freedom to the Court's decision can be clarified by
comparing the Court's reasoning with the opinion of Justice Thomas, concurring in
part and dissenting in part. 264 He disagrees with the majority about many things,
but what I want to examine is his refusal to take seriously constitutional academic
freedom. This refusal can be seen clearly in his preliminary point that he finds
"perplexing" the Court's failure to distinguish its rejection of a school board's
judgment that a racially diverse faculty would have educational benefits in a prior
case; 265 this would be a material argument if it were not doctrinally clear that only
universities enjoy academic freedom, a point neither the Court nor Justice Thomas
discussed. 266 But Justice Thomas presses his skepticism much further. He attacks
comprehensively, if indirectly, the notion that academic decision making is entitled
to any constitutional protection, finding no constitutional interest in having law
schools at all or in using academic criteria for admission. He states, "[T]here is no
basis for a right of public universities to do what would otherwise violate the Equal
'267
Protection Clause.
Justice Thomas's examination of the precedents on academic freedom lacks
intellectual seriousness, and he wholly ignores the scholarly literature on the
subject. He quotes Justice Frankfurter from Sweezy, but only quibbles about the
precise holdings of several cases and moves on with a sweeping dismissal. He
does make an important point: the Grutter court did not explain adequately how
268
institutional academic freedom can counter other constitutional prohibitions.
The Court's rhetoric blazes when extolling diversity within elite institutions rather
than when praising academic autonomy. Indeed, the Grutter decision differs from
all prior academic freedom decisions in using modest rhetoric to enlarge the
substance of academic freedom rather than using fiery rhetoric to make a narrow
decision. 269 But in the clinch, Grutter justifies the weight it affords educational
270
autonomy only by quoting Powell in Bakke.

264. Id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
265. Id. at 353 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
266. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 264. Professor Charles Fried once
thought that the Court or, at least, Justice O'Connor might extend the Bakke diversity rationale to
elementary and secondary schools. "Wygant does not establish the contrary, given that the
preferential program there was so crudely drawn that it could not possibly have met the further
requirement of narrow tailoring." Charles Fried, Forward.Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13,
62 (1995).
267. Grutter,539 U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. Id. at 363.
269. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 257 (describing how academic freedom
cases often employ stirring rhetoric without deciding much).
270. Jeffrey Rosen finds O'Connor's rhetoric more unequivocally affirmative in comparing it
to the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey. Jeffrey Rosen, Light
Footprint,NEW REPUBLIC, July 7 & 14, 2003, at 16 (internal citations omitted):
[U]nlike her coy performance in reaffirming Roe, where she upheld the result without
endorsing its reasoning, O'Connor made clear she agreed with the core holding of
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What is involved in this case is the adjustment of competing constitutional
concerns. Even if one grants that affirmative action raises serious concerns under
the Equal Protection Clause, a competing First Amendment interest may justify its
use. This reflects the familiar judicial technique of balancing in constitutional
cases, an approach long associated with Justice Powell and going back at least as
far as Justice Frankfurter. Balancing competing constitutional interests occurs
often in academic freedom cases because university decision making not only is
authorized by state law, but is protected by the Constitution. The peculiarity of
this interest balancing in academic freedom cases is compounded by the unusual
notion that a state university exists legally both as a state actor subject to
constitutional restraint and as a holder of constitutional rights. This can be seen
most clearly in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,271 where the decision
not to recognize a substantive due process right to fair grading is supported
materially by deference to academic decision making sanctioned by academic
272
freedom.
The nub of Justice Thomas's opinion in Grutter concerning academic freedom
emerges in his mockery of the contention that a university might have a
constitutional interest in employing selective admission standards. 273 Of course, it
is true that a school could achieve an ethnically diverse class by offering positions
by lot among high school graduates. 274 The Texas 10% scheme is a variant of
admission by sample. But the decision to admit by employing criteria designed to
enroll the students "best suited" to the education offered lies at the core of
institutional academic freedom, because it will constitute the type of instruction
and community intellectual life possible. 275 This may be easier to see in regards to
faculty: a decision by an institution to require faculty to have doctorate degrees
may be excessively rigid, but the school needs the freedom to make that choice to
promote a certain type of scholarship and teaching. Similarly, the decision of the
University of Michigan Law School to admit only students with unusual
intellectual credentials may leave out students who could profit from the education,
but the school has a right to orient itself toward a particular intellectual or

Bakke that universities have a compelling interest in the educational benefits that
flow from diversity. To preserve the educational autonomy that the First Amendment
protects, O'Connor concluded, judges should defer to the judgments of educators about
how best to fulfill their educational mission.
271. 474U.S.214(1985).
272.

Id. at 226 n.12.

273. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 360 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Thomas's preliminary point that having a public law school in
Michigan is not a compelling state interest misses the mark entirely. Id. at 357. That an academic
institution has a right to make academic decisions does not require that anyone has the right to
found an academic institution. His point is like claiming that I have no Fourth Amendment
protection against searches of my home because I have no constitutional interest in having a
house.
274. Justice Thomas simplifies and distorts the complex relationship between colleges and
universities and high schools in establishing academic standards.
275. For a nuanced account of the justice of selective admissions, see FULLINWIDER &
LICHTENBERG, supra note 249.
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educational project. 276 Sophisticated approaches to the law are more likely to
develop and be critiqued in such a school than in one with only minimum
standards. The point of academic freedom is that government officials are less
likely to prize or effectively manage this socially valuable but tortuous
development of understanding than are academics. Justice Thomas's rather
impromptu populism proves this empirical observation likely to be true once again.
Justice Thomas makes some interesting subsidiary points. The attractive
normative core to his position is his insistence that education for blacks should not
be thought inferior ipso facto because of the absence of whites. But, the normative
core of the Court's opinion more nearly is that education of whites should be
thought inferior in the absence of other races. It may be true, as the studies he cites
suggest, that historically and predominantly black colleges better serve some black
students than do diverse schools. 277 Justice Thomas seems to think that we would
reject instinctively as discriminatory a legal claim, built on these premises, that a
historically black school would have an academic freedom right to deny admission
to white students on educational grounds. 278 He wants to stress the unacceptable
consequences of using race as a factor in admissions even if it has educational
279
benefits.
He is right to press this question. But his example may prove the opposite. If a
historically black school could point to a plausible factual basis to believe that
black students will learn better in a student body with few whites, and a court
believed that this view was not substantially influenced by racial animosity toward
whites (no small hurdles), academic freedom should help the school survive the
strict scrutiny needed to find that its exclusions did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The point of Grutter is that a limited use of race may be permissible if
justified by a persuasive, or at least, plausible educational judgment. Where Justice
Thomas's hypothetical would likely come afoul of the Constitution is on "narrow
tailoring," the issue of how and to what extent a school can use race as a factor. A
280
categorical exclusion of whites surely would fail, as Gratz v. Bollinger
demonstrates. A historically black school should not be able to use race as an
admissions factor more than necessary to achieve important educational benefits.
Justice Thomas's argument ignores this constraint. In an example he uses, it strains
credulity that a university currently only 5.4% white could show that it would
281
realize additional educational benefits by reducing the number of whites.
276. Justice Thomas is quite right that the dispute in Grutter arises from the use of highly
selective admissions criteria, which the great majority of higher education institutions do not
employ. For preserving access to higher education for minorities and all lower income
Americans, it is even more important that government preserve the affordability of these valuable
institutions, most of which are public. See Kermit L. Hall, The Biggest Barrierto College Isn't
Race, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 2003, at B20; Greg Winter, As State Colleges Cut
Classes, Students Struggle to Finish, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at Al: Elizabeth Farelle,
Public-College Tuition Rise is Largest in Three Decades, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003,

at Al.
277.

Grutter,539 U.S. at 364-65.

278.

Id. at 365-66.
Id.

279.
280.

281.

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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One could imagine the further claim that an all-white school would have
distinct educational benefits. Indeed such views were once pervasive, but that
claim stands condemned by history both as based upon raw prejudice and having
fostered a scholarly ideology of subordination. 282 One might condemn per se any
exclusion of or cap on a minority race or ethnic group by a majority as prejudicial,
but the different histories of whites and blacks in the United States make it
impossible to treat as morally or constitutionally identical discrimination by blacks
against whites as discrimination by whites against blacks. In any event, official
support for the perpetuation of historically black institutions contrasts dramatically
with official pressure to end the racially identifiable character of historically white
schools, and the difference is justified when acknowledged by the educational
advantage historically black schools offer black students. What is difficult in
Grutter is to distinguish the specifically educational benefits from diverse student
bodies from the general social benefits that the Court says universities may not rely
upon.
Justice Thomas scores his most direct hit in contrasting the deference to
educational judgments in Grutter with the absence of deference in the Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI") case, where the Court held that admitting only men
violated the Equal Protection clause. 283 VMI had defended its exclusion of women
on the ground that their presence would impair its "adversative" educational
method, but the Court thought the problems manageable. 284 Justice Thomas must
be right to some extent in viewing the distinction between the cases as the
admissions policy of an elite law school and that of a Southern military school,
although it might better be said that the intellectual ambitions of the former are
closer to the values of academic freedom than the "character building" or
inculcative goals of the latter. Nonetheless, the Court has failed to take seriously
the educational benefits of separate single sex education even though they appear
plausible, at least in some contexts. The Court should have addressed these issues
more cautiously. This may be because members of the Court have yet to see a case
where they believe that exclusion of one gender can be disentangled from
traditional gender stereotypes. While the single-sex university precedents are not
encouraging, it would be interesting to see what the Court would do with a
program more easily disentangled from stereotypes-an all-female engineering
program, for example.
Grutter does establish the importance of institutional academic freedom as a
constitutional interest. The constitutional status of the deference paid to good faith
academic decision making performs strenuous work in meeting the test of
providing a compelling state interest. The logic of the Court's doctrinal argument
requires that academic freedom have this significance, even if Justice O'Connor's
opinion only stingily gives it rhetorical support. Justice Thomas's dissent shows
how alarming a constitutional law that ignored institutional academic freedom
282. See Charles R. Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Critiqueof the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001).
283. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
284. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-43. Virginia also failed to show that its
female-only alternative provided an "equal" if separate educational opportunity.
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would be, exposing the intellectual aspirations of universities to unchecked
political meddling. Thomas also shows the extent to which the Court has failed to
come to grips with the implications of institutional academic freedom in dealing
with relatively easy claims of discrimination.
Supporters of college and university interests must be heartened by Grutter, but
should by no means be complacent. The decision makes academic freedom far
more doctrinally secure and should materially strengthen arguments to lower court
judges that they should defer to good faith academic decision making, even in the
face of claims by individuals that require articulation of a compelling interest. Yet,
it would be naive not to suspect that the university prevailed in Grutter more
because its views accorded with those of a majority of the Court or at least made
sense to them rather than because of a new consensus about the constitutional
importance of deference to schools' educational judgments. As I argue below,
courts' embrace of institutional academic freedom may be nourished more by
confidence in the motives of college and university leaders than by the logic of
First Amendment doctrine. While Grutter can provide a foundation for a
reinvigorated notion of academic freedom, whether it does so will depend both on
how well colleges and universities perform in the eyes of the educated public and
how well they argue their legal positions.
III. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

A. Causes of Decline
It is difficult to explain the erosion of constitutional recognition of academic
freedom before Grutterusing only lawyers' tools. One cannot discount the extent
to which the prevailing doctrine, which could be characterized either as vague or
subtle, confuses judges who lack an understanding of the academic context and
values. Judicial decisions often seem the result of purposeful misreadings driven
by larger concerns. In this section, I attempt to portray those larger concerns,
reflecting on changes both in higher education and in the larger society that offer
the most persuasive explanation for the waning of constitutional academic
freedom.
1. The cases discussed above illustrate what we know from many sources: the
issues that drove disputes about the nature of academic speech concerned race,
ethnicity, and gender. During the 1970s and 1980s, the absolute number of
students of color and female students increased dramatically. Black students
increased from 227,000 in 1960285 to 1,393,000 in 1990.286 They also increased
relative to rapidly increasing numbers of white students, being outnumbered by

285. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83 at table 261, availableat http://www2.census.gov/prod2/
statcomp/documents/1982_83-Ol.pdf [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1982-83].
286. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2000 at table 301, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
statab/sec04.pdf [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000].
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fifteen to one in 1960,287 but only by eight to one in 1990.288 Female students
became a gender majority, growing from 34% in 1960289 to 54% in 1990.290
291
During the same period, faculty also became far more diverse.
The nation's colleges and universities played a unique role during this time in
creating a freely choosing, integrated society of articulate equals within a large
culture still quite segregated in residence, work, and religion. Higher education
often provided both white and black students with their first experiences of an
integrated environment. Moreover, it was one in which they were expected to be
critical of inherited truths, while establishing their own identities and competing
for credentials to take into the job market. Within this context, it is hardly
surprising that there was conflict that focused on race. What is striking is that the
conflict was so circumscribed.
The shape of these changes also is suggestive. Faculty of color and women
often found positions more promptly in new study programs or departments
devoted to race or gender than in traditional disciplines. Even within established
departments, minority faculty disproportionately concerned themselves with
formerly undervalued concerns of their group or sex. Thus, issues of integration or
demographic diversity have persistently been intertwined with issues of intellectual
agenda and status. The merits of ideas concerning the relative centrality of race and
gender have had, and been seen to have, power consequences for individual careers
and for the direction of the higher education itself. It is surprising neither that
many contemporary scholars chose to bend study and teaching agendas toward
issues of interest to them nor that others resisted the change.
To some extent, the change in tone on campus created by the presence of so
many minorities and women meant that it became impolite to casually disparage or
mock them when it had been common beforehand. Many charges about "political
correctness" stem from open complaints by female or minority students about
statements made by white men, rather than by institutional actions. 292 In other
words, the protest focused on a challenge to the propriety of someone's speech by

287. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1982-83, supra note 285, at table 261.
288. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 286, at table 301.
289. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1982-83, supra note 285, at table 261.
290. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 286, at table 301. The Department of
Education reported that the number of black undergraduate students enrolled rose by more than
500,000 from 1990 to 2001, when the total was 1,657,100. Almanac, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 27, 2004 at 16. The number of Hispanic undergraduates doubled during the same period to
1,440,400. Id. The number of white undergraduates was static during the same period. Id.
291. Assessments of the gender and racial composition of faculty at post-secondary
institutions earlier than 1985 actually is hard to come by. By 1985, women constituted 27.6% of
full-time faculty in higher education, and racial minorities constituted 9.9%. DEBORAH J. WILDS,
AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUC. 1999-2000, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
STATUS REPORT 98 TABLE 20 (2000). NCES's most recent study, for the fall of 2001, reports that
women constitute 38.4% of full-time faculty, and minorities, 14.7%. E.D. TAGS, NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, STAFF IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2001, AND SALARIES OF
FULL-TIME INSTRUCTIONAL FACULTY, 2001-02 5 Table e (Nov. 2003), available at

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004159.pdf.
292. Mark Tushnet insightfully analyzed this phenomenon in PoliticalCorrectness, the Law,
and the LegalAcademy, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 127, 150-52 (1992).
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others at the same or lower level of power within an academic community. The
sense of correctness in speech has come primarily from informal disapproval and
reflects a change in mores rather than from an institutional striving for conformity.
While such changes in what language is socially acceptable can inhibit legitimate
debate about important issues, at least until the changes in etiquette become
naturalized, it is hardly a loss for intellectual life generally that racist or sexist slurs
293
or jokes have become solecisms.
2. These changes occurred during a period of skepticism about the neutrality of
truth criteria within disciplines. Academic freedom depends on the assumption
that scholars can separate truth from falsehood using disciplinary methods and
criteria. The 1950s appear to have been a time of unusual consensus in many
disciplines about how serious work ought to proceed. 294 The tumults of the civil
rights era and the Vietnam War called forth many criticisms and new perspectives,
but the entrance of that generation into faculty ranks led to more theoretic
questioning of the assumptions of disciplines. Some fields, like English, where the
disciplinary consensus about the canon or the nature of literature had relatively
295
shallow philosophical foundations, ruptured.
These changes borrowed from a more radical philosophical questioning of the
nature of truth. Foucault, perhaps, articulated most forcefully that apparently
neutral systems of knowledge may actually represent structures of social and
political power. 296 Contemporary anthropology, too, assaulted inherited notions of

293. Byme, supra note 60, at 419.
294. Conservatives were not so happy at the time about developments in higher education
and wrote elegies for declining standards. Russell Kirk, the thoughtful and independent traditional
conservative, wrote a column on higher education in the NationalReview throughout the 1950s.
He wrote, "By 1953, at possibly the majority of American institutions of higher learning, the
process of lowering standards was well advanced." RUSSELL KIRK, DECADENCE AND RENEWAL
IN THE HIGHER LEARNING 5 (1978). See also WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., GOD AND MAN AT

YALE: THE SUPERSTITIONS OF "ACADEMIC FREEDOM" (1951). Buckley's youthful polemic
against how Yale faculty undermine belief in Christianity and individualism still sizzles on the
page. He more clearly states the significance of ideological battles over higher education than
most of his successors:
I consider this battle of educational theory important and worth time and thought even
in the context of a world-situation that seems to render totally irrelevant any fight
except the power struggle against Communism. I myself believe that the duel between
Christianity and atheism is the most important in the world. I further believe that the
struggle between individualism and collectivism is the same struggle reproduced on
another level. I believe that if and when the menace of Communism is gone, other vital
battles, at present subordinated, will emerge to the foreground. And the winner must
have help from the classroom.
Id. at xvi-xvii.
It is interesting to note that Buckley thought the problem of professors who scoffed at
religion should be addressed by the board and alumni requiring adherence to Christian orthodoxy,
surely a form of "religious correctness," while his successors bristle at any corporate standards of
speech, even when adopted by the faculty.
295. See GERALD GRAFF, PROFESSING LITERATURE: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1987).
296. The influence of Foucalt in radical legal thought is stressed in DANIEL A FARBER &
SUZANNE SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN

LAW 22-24 (1997).
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universal truths in favor of contextual meaning within cultural groups. 2 9 7 Richard
Rorty argued that, since we can never grasp the world as it is or represent it in our
language, we should strive for progressive consensus. 298 Debates about these
issues were extended through the humanities and, to a lesser extent, the social
sciences.
In this context, debate about scholarly approaches could easily be understood as
a struggle for political control. Arguments could seem out of bounds, because the
bounds were shifting and contested. Also, extreme claims and rhetoric could claim
sanction under some perspective, the dismissal of which could be attacked as
politically motivated. In short, scholarly discourse could collapse into politics,
even though academic freedom and the status of the professoriate both arose from
an earlier effective distinction between them. Many academics experienced these
299
struggles painfully as "intolerance."
Moreover, extreme claims about the ability of scholarship to make meaningful
claims about the external world undermine the justifications for academic freedom
at all. The 1915 Declaration based protection for the college or university on the
conditions needed for scholars to improve knowledge. 300 If scholarship is
understood merely as a witty shadow play, then the justification for professors'
autonomy from those who pay the bills is seriously undermined. Richard Rorty or
Stanley Fish might believe that academic freedom would continue as a practice,
even without claims that it furthered inquiry about the truth, because it created
useful conditions for academic work and is imbedded in well-protected
301
institutional arrangements.
But it seems likely that such institutional arrangements will and, perhaps,
should decay without the animating vitality of hard truth as a goal and test for
academic discourse. The absence of truth as a criterion for scholarship would seem
inevitably to license speech in the service of interests, including self-interest, and
even deceit; the epistemic and ethical seem to require mutual support. Moreover,
dispensing with truth as such would fatally weaken the claims that academics can
make to the wider world for a respect and forbearance not shown other
professional groups. Professor Rabban warned, "People who depend on academic
freedom, including the antirealists themselves, may be fortunate that the denial of
any correspondence between scholarship and an external world beyond
intersubjectivity has failed to attract popular support. '302 Moreover, the public
would be right to reject an academy that offers scholarship only as the consensus

297. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 20-35 (1983).
298. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 333-42 (1980).

299. Professor Neil Hamilton gives a moving, first person account of how the experience of
accusation prompted his analysis of parallels to the McCarthy period in HAMILTON, supra note
99, at xi-xvi.
300. See 1915 Declaration, supra note 23, at 393.
301. See Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have PhilosophicalPresuppositions?in
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 21-42 (Louis Menand ed. 1996); STANLEY FISH, THERE'S
NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 102 (1994).

302. David Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 CAL. L. REV.
1377, 1389 (1998).
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of those with good political views, at least to the extent that the public is hostile or
indifferent to the political concerns of those academics who concur. But it is in the
interests of everyone to provide answers to questions that are true, or truer than
those previously accepted.
But all this argument about the nature of knowledge has itself been an academic
episode. Scholars continue routinely to debate theories against evidence. Indeed,
as has often been pointed out, relativists routinely invoke the very stance of
objectivity that they claim to be illusory, arguing that their accounts of "truth" are
truer than those they criticize. 30 3 The practices of academic discourse that measure
the worth of disciplinary assertions by the extent to which they provide an
objectively superior account of interesting phenomena, something more true than
previously asserted, seems to have survived quite intact. 304 How can coherent
discussion and debate survive without these assumptions? Controversy about the
nature of knowledge has fostered some welcome humility about the application of
scientific methods to the study of nature, as well as to values, meaning, and human
agency, and a broader recognition that interpretations of human events will often
reflect the situation of the interpreter. 30 5 The effort to use reason and evidence to

303.

See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 15 (1997):

The familiar point that relativism is self-refuting remains valid in spite of its
familiarity: We cannot criticize some of our own claims of reason without employing
reason at some other point to formulate and support those criticisms. This may result in
shrinkage of the domain of rationally defensible judgments, but not its disappearance.
304. Some thoroughgoing relativists, such as Stanley Fish, argue that these practices
continue as a matter of organizational behavior and political control. See Fish, supra note 301, at
102. But we need not content ourselves with so little. Professor Michael Williams, for example,
argues for a contextualist theory of knowledge, which recognizes that knowledge arises in
community endeavors, like academic disciplines, the methodology of which both gives criteria
and can be challenged. MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY 159-70 (2001). He does not view the dependence on
unchallengeable criteria as relegating us to relativism. He writes:
A contextualist view of knowledge and justification does not commit one to holding
that a reference to context is part of the content of a knowledge-claim . . . . A
knowledge-claim commits one to holding that all significant potential defeaterspossibilities which, if realized, would make one's belief either false or inadequately
grounded-have been eliminated; the contextual element comes in to fix what
defeaters should be counted significant. But presuppositions as to what is significant
are themselves open to criticism, which can be informationally or economically
triggered . . . . Recontextualization can go on indefinitely. But this is the open
endedness of inquiry, not a vicious regress ofjustification.
Id. at 226-27. Williams tellingly criticizes relativists for requiring that epistemological accounts
of knowledge stand on unquestionable "foundations." "In effect, the relativist accepts the
foundationalist picture of the structure of knowledge while denying that there are any (or enough)
foundational elements that are universally valid ....
Relativism, we might say, is pluralistic
foundationalism." Id. at 224.
305. See Bernard Williams, Online Chat, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED online newspaper (Nov. 12,
2002), at http://educationtalk.guardian.co.uk/WebX?14@20I.RrLiadYjjpH.0@.3ba77186/61 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004). Bernard Williams wrote in response to an online question:
In one sense, changing truths are themselves absolute-if it is true that it is raining in
Oxford today then it will always be true that it was raining in Oxford on November 12,
2002. However, if you mean absolute TRUTH as meaning one absolute truth about the
universe, I doubt there is such a thing. On my view being honest is part of being

2004]

CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

make assertions that are true objectively, and the ethical necessity of doing so, in
fact exposes academic assertion to criticism on the grounds that they are false or
inadequate in some important way. 3 06 Faith in the value of reason does not require
certainty about its fruits.
Extreme relativism has garnered few adherents among professional
philosophers. 307 A wide range of "pragmatist" understandings of knowledge are,
of course, entirely consistent with the values of scholarly inquiry and academic
freedom. Michael Williams, for example, argues, "Finding theories that 'work is a
way of finding theories that are true (as far as we can tell), not the other way
around.' 308 It seems wrong to suppose that the founders of the AAUP entertained
a naive correspondence theory of knowledge, which now exploded, leaves their
notion of academic freedom without any foundation. Debate about the meaning
and content of knowledge has pervaded philosophy for a very long time. 30 9 John
310
Dewey, the greatest of American pragmatists, after all, founded the AAUP.
Alan Ryan argues that "nothing at all follows about academic freedom from our
espousing an objectivist or pragmatist view of truth." 3 11 He seems right, so long as
truth does not "drop out" of pragmatist accounts, allowing consensus to be founded
on criteria of truth, and not just on the convenient or desirable.
Moreover, the debates about postmodernism have called forth nuanced and
persuasive accounts of how scholarship relates to the world as it is and must abide
by a criterion of truthfulness. 312 For example, the philosopher Bernard Williams
recently published a subtle, extended study of the virtue of truth particularly in
truthful: the other part consists in trying to make sure you are right.
Id.
306. Michael Williams makes this point well in interpreting Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962), in which descriptions of "paradigm shifts" in the history of science
have sometimes been taken to be dictated more by sociological than intellectual influences:
On Kuhn's model, science works because, as an institution, it has managed to strike a
delicate balance between freedom and constraint, and because its procedures, however
theoretically mediated, involve interactions with nature that we do not fully control.
Normal-scientific research is what throws up the anomalies that eventually provoke
theoretical advance.
WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 233.
307. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY 41 (1997):
Postmodernists do not justify their more extreme conclusions with compelling
arguments. Nor do they even grapple with the technical issues about physics and
language that any modem account of these matters needs to confront. For this reason,
their influence has been relatively slight in philosophy, where far more nuanced
accounts of these matters abound.
308. WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 239.
309. The American tradition is described and the causes discussed in BRUCE KUKLICK, A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA, 1720-2000 (2001).

310. Dewey was emphatic that experts in a field rather than any interested persons had to
maintain standards of a discipline. See John Dewey, Academic Freedom, 23 EDU. REV. 1, 4-5
(1902).

311. ALAN RYAN, LIBERAL ANXIETIES AND LIBERAL EDUCATION 158 (1998).
312. Lawyers might find particularly interesting Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth:
You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996), wherein Dworkin argues that moral
assertions must be objective by their nature, or linguistic structure, and would be incoherent as
statements of preferences.
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intellectual work, which accounts for how historical interpretation both makes
sense of the past for a situated "we" and is bounded by truth both as to facts and as
to the credible explanations for changes in human life.3 13 Williams conceives of
truth as an intrinsic value, arising from basic human needs for cooperation, and
analyzes it in terms of its constituent virtues of "Sincerity" and "Accuracy. ' 314 For
Williams, a robust commitment to truth is necessary for us to even know what we
think.315 Such work enables scholars to consciously understand the difficult
316
challenges of academic work and explain its value to citizens.
Given the long history of epistemological struggle, it is unlikely that skepticism
as such was responsible for the anxiety associated with post-modernism. It seems
more likely that the anxiety reflected an estrangement of professional norms from
those of the wider society or a loss of belief that knowledge would aid society.
The comedy of David Lodge's Small World317 may capture the period more richly.
Louis Menand described the deal struck in academic freedom:
The deal they offered was that in return for exemption from ordinary
market conditions, professors would commit themselves to the unselfish
and disinterested pursuit of truth. Implicit in the argument they made
was that the public-though supposedly the real "owners" of
universities-would abstain from interference in university affairs out
of its own self-interest ....
And the most remarkable thing about this
deal was that American society-with, to be sure, many reservations
and regrets along the way-bought it.318
The anxieties associated with post-modernism may have more to do with a loss

313. BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 149-71, 233-69 (2002). See also
WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 125 ("[E]pistemological arguments are irreducibly normative:
justification involves entitlement, responsibility, and adequate grounding. Standards of
responsibility and adequacy are not fixed by nature: they are fixed by us in the light of our
interest, projects, and assessment of our situation.").
314. See WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 125.

315.

Id.

316. Bernard Williams associates the virtue of sincerity in making assertions with the
nurturing of trust within a relevant community and accuracy with overcoming internal and
external obstacles to getting our observations right. He writes of accuracy:
Self-conscious pursuit of the truth requires resistance to such things as self-deception
and wishful thinking, and one component of the virtue of accuracy-which, again, is
why it is a virtue and not merely a disposition of reliability-lies in the skills and
attitudes that resist the pleasure principle, in all its forms, from a gross need to believe
the agreeable, to mere laziness in checking one's investigations. The virtues of
accuracy include, very importantly, dispositions and strategies for sustaining the
defenses of belief against wish, and against one of the products of wish, self-deception.
BERNARD WILLIAMS, supra note 313, at 125.
317. Morris Zapp, Lodge's jaunty post-structuralist literary critic replies to anguished
concern about whether interpretation has any point if it cannot find meaning in literature:
The point, of course, is to uphold the institution of academic literary studies. We
maintain our position in society by performing a certain ritual, just like any other group
of workers in the realm of discourse-lawyers, politicians, journalists. And as it looks
as if we have done our duty for today, shall we adjourn for a drink?
DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD 33 (Warner paperback ed. 1984).
318. LouIs MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 417 (2001).
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of faith by some scholars that their work would improve the conditions of society
or their students than to epistemology.
3. College and university efforts to welcome or assimilate increased numbers of
students of color occurred within a revival among student affairs professionals of
in loco parentis. Before the 1960s, and, even more so, before the great influx of
older students under the GI Bill, colleges and universities had seen themselves
319
responsible for the development of the young people resident on their campuses.
This generally took the form of policing for alcohol and sexual relations, as well as
some kinds of religious observation, even in state schools. One immediate
consequence of the sixties was a prompt withdrawal of such supervision and
requirements. For a period, colleges and universities saw their students as
autonomous adults who would make their own choices as they saw fit.
By the 1980s, this tide had begun to turn again. Many colleges and universities
began to try to instruct their student bodies about alcohol and drug abuse. Concerns
about sexually transmitted diseases and then AIDS caused schools to offer
guidance on "safe sex" and responsibility toward others. Counseling for stress and
anxiety became commonly available services. Finally, schools began requiring or
encouraging service to the community. These initiatives largely occurred outside
the curriculum. They instituted a regimen of personal development based on
"health" and "service" that resembled earlier approaches to character formation
320
based overtly on morality.
Many of the approaches to fostering multiculturalism within colleges and
universities were mediated by student affairs professionals steeped in this
emerging revival of in loco parentis. 32 1 Thus, schools' attempts to deal with race
and gender took on the attributes of their other services. Minority students and
women were made comfortable by "centers" and special deans, as well as by
protection against racist and sexist insults. 322 Students expressing racist attitudes
in speech and behavior were encouraged or required to admit that they had a
problem and seek help, not unlike students who abused alcohol.
While such approaches could sometimes seem absurd or threatening to the
independence of individuals, they should not be dismissed as meddling. Colleges'
and universities' attempts to provide guidance for living to their students reflect
traditional values for fostering wholesome personal development within residential
institutions and respond to real needs not otherwise met in a consumer driven
culture. However, these therapeutic efforts too often lacked substantial faculty
involvement and often failed to give scope to the intellectual and educational
traditions of the institutions. Many of the cases where college and university

319. See Byrne, supra note 60, at 427 n. 124.
320. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, HIGHER LEARNING 49-52 (1986). While I wrote this, the
hallways at my law school were plastered with signs urging us to use the stairs rather than the
elevator in order to be healthy.
321. Indeed, perhaps the most significant change in higher education since the 1960s has
been the increase in the size and scope of tasks undertaken by school administrative staffs. Alan
Ryan has written that modem administrators provide "a sort of student welfare state." RYAN,
supra note 316, at 173. One should be dubious about the extent to which university decision
making, when made by non-academic administrators, actually rests on academic grounds.
322. See id.
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actions impinge most alarmingly on free speech involve choices made by nonfaculty administrators. For example, the interpretive guide for the University of
Michigan's speech code, which indicated that students might be subject to
discipline if they failed to invite a gay student to a party or laughed at a classmate
323
who stuttered, was prepared by the university's affirmative action office.
Similarly, the AAUP's critique of the University of New Hampshire's punishment
of Professor Don Silva emphasizes that the absence of faculty perspective and
participation in enforcing sexual harassment policies leads to too little concern for
324
academic freedom.
4. Denunciations of these developments as a wave of "political correctness"
reflect one of the interesting cultural phenomena of recent years which will provide
a rich lode for future historians. Books and articles tumbled from the presses
competing to denounce in the most hysterical tones attempts within colleges and
universities to revise curricula or create speech norms for a newly multicultural
environment of uncertain depth. 325 Some of these initiatives, of course, demanded
criticism and invited satire. But one cannot but be impressed by the apocalyptic
326
tone and violent rhetoric of the anti-politically correct crusaders.
What was going on here? After all, virtually no one contests that American
higher education is the finest in the world, in part because it provides freedom of
expression and flexibility of institutional arrangement to students and faculty to a
degree unmatched by any other existing system of higher education. 327 Students
and faculty flock here from all comers of the world. 328 Demand for admission to
these supposed temples of intolerance has never been keener. Graduates donate
more money to support their successors than at any time in the history of the

323. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 857-58 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Then-Michigan
President Lee Bollinger later disclaimed the propriety of the Michigan rules struck down in Doe.
Lee C. Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier and the University, in UNFETTERED ExPRESSION:
FREEDOM IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 34 (Peggie J. Hollingsworth ed., 2000).

324. See supra text accompanying notes 115-120. At Georgetown, I have served for years
on a Speech and Expression Committee, containing students, administrators and four experienced
professors.
325. See, e.g., David Horowitz, Leftwing Fascism and the American Dream, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 467, 471 (1996) ("The attack on individualism, the decentering of the
individual, the elevation of group claims over individual rights, the cult of irrationality and
ethnicity (including gender and sex 'ethnicity')-this is the current orthodoxy of the academy.").
326. See, e.g., Dinesh D'Souza. ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 13, 15, 229 (1991):
[A]n academic and cultural revolution is under way at American universities ....
These revolutionaries inhabit the offices of presidents, provosts, deans, and other
administrators .... [B]y precept and example, universities have taught [students] that
'all rules are unjust' and 'all preferences are principled'; that justice is simply the will of
the stronger party; that standards and values are arbitrary, and the ideal of the educated
person is largely a figment of bourgeois white male ideology, which should be cast
aside; that individual rights are a red flag for signaling social privilege ... that debates
are best conducted... by accusation, intimidation, and official prosecution ....
327. See RYAN, supra note 311, at 148 ("More students than ever are getting what is at
present the best undergraduate education in the world.").
328. One Spanish graduate student, for example, hopes to teach in America because in Spain
"the university is very politicized." Vivian Marx, Europe Tries to Attract a New Generation of
Academics," CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., MARCH 8,2002, at A40, A42.
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world. 329 By every measure, American higher education, for all its problems, is,
and is acknowledged to be, a success.
Lawrence Levine seems on the mark in finding Richard Hofstadter's classic
essay on the "paranoid style" to be indispensable for understanding the hysteria of
the denunciations. 330 Rereading many of these crusaders against "political
correctness" certainly brings to mind Hofstadter's portrait of a persistent style of
political critique in American life:
The central image is that of a vast and sinister conspiracy, gigantic and
yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and
destroy a way of life ....The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this
conspiracy in apocalyptic terms-he traffics in the birth and death of
whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values.
He is always manning the barricades of civilization. He constantly lives
at a turning point: it is now or never in organizing resistance to
conspiracy .... Since what is at stake is always a conflict between
absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not a willingness
331
to compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish.
Hofstadter also argues that the paranoid style may be stimulated when
exponents of a viewpoint feel excluded from power: "Feeling that they have no
access to political bargaining or the making of decisions, they find their original
conception of the world of power as omnipotent, sinister, and malicious fully
confirmed. ' 332 Certainly, the complainants against speech regulation frequently
bewailed that college and university power was in the hands of a liberal elite that
ignored their concerns.
Although Levine offers a helpful response to the political correctness critics
about curricular matters, particularly in showing how few actually understand the
developments they decry, his praises of contemporary approaches to humanities
only constitute one side of a multi-dimensional debate about education and
scholarship that pervades faculties outside the hard sciences. 333 Such debate will
continue beyond our time and must be left alone by political and judicial
authorities. Unfortunately, he has little to say about college and university
regulation of offensive speech, other than calling them "a stumbling attempt to
adapt" to the new ethnic and gender diversity on campuses. 334 This seems fair so
long as one acknowledges that there have been excesses that point to the need for
some colleges and universities to assert the primacy of reasoned debate as the
center of intellectual life.
Still, the main impression from reading judicial decisions has been the banality
of the utterances that have been at issue. Speakers have been prosecuted for using
inflammatory or vulgar words and epithets, not for advancing theories either of the

329.

See COUNCIL FOR AID TO EDUC., VOLUNTARY SUPPORT OF EDUCATION (2003).

330.

LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 30-31 (1996).

331.

ESSAYS
332.
333.
334.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER

29-31 (1965).
Id. at 39.
LEVINE, supra note 330, at 29-30.
Id. at 28.
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right or the left. Putting forward Don Silva or Dean Cohen as a martyr for
intellectual freedom is no more persuasive than offering the current Prince of
Wales as an epitome of the divine right of kings. No one is persecuting the serious
exposition of ideas.
5. The demise of constitutional academic freedom reflects, above all, a loss of
confidence by the judiciary in the wisdom of academic leaders. To some extent,
this reflects changes in the outlook of judicial conservatism. Conservative theory
in the 1950s emphasized deference to established non-governmental leaders.
Conservatism has become more populist and more "liberal" in the economic sense.
More recently, it embraces judicial control over organs of civil authority. This
judicial inclination is further stimulated by the sense that college and university
faculty adhere to social values substantially to the left of the judiciary, although
this has probably been true since the beginning of the twentieth century.
But study of these cases does not indicate conservative judges playing a more
conspicuous role in undermining academic freedom than liberal judges (except in
the area of affirmative action in admissions). Indeed, liberal judges have insisted
on the personal nature of free speech rights of both faculty and students against the
college or university and have seemed at times to view academic grounds for
limiting the scope of such freedoms as hocus pocus. Judge Reinhardt and Judge
Cabranes plainly envisioned roles for themselves in resolving intra-university
speech disputes by elaborating general free speech doctrine, based on their distrust
of university decision makers. 335 Indeed, a theme of this article is that judicial
enforcement of the civil notion of freedom of speech against colleges and
universities today represents a specific external threat to academic freedom.
It is striking that the judges who have contributed the most to creating a
doctrine of institutional academic freedom have been centrists, concerned for some
336
balance of freedom and order: Justices Frankfurter, Powell, Stevens, and Souter.
These justices share a regard for learning, appreciation for the complexity of
institutional arrangements, and skepticism about judicial lawmaking. They seem
united in the understanding that for free scholarship to flourish, academic
judgments about the quality of speech must be made, and that the freedom of the
institution to exercise this function precludes political leaders from insisting that
current popular ideologies be followed and civil libertarians from insisting that
every person has an equal right to speak as he or she may wish.
Finally, judicial skepticism about academic freedom reflects a loss of
confidence in self-government by professionals generally. Academic freedom
does depend on viewing the professor as a professional needing a type of

335. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 908, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Vega v.
Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 480 (2d Cir. 2001) (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
336. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 228 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan get honorable mention; they coined powerful rhetoric even if they did not write opinions
building a distinctive doctrine of academic freedom. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Warren,
C.J.); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (Brennan, J.).
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autonomy to make guild rules apart from popular control to achieve her
professional goals. The courts have tolerated far less of this autonomy in the last
twenty-five years. The First Amendment and antitrust laws have invalidated fee
fixing and bans on advertising claimed to be necessary to preserve professional
standards of lawyers, architects, engineers, and doctors. 337 These decisions can be
read to indicate that the value of any such professional practices have less social
value than individual liberty or democratic control. What is surprising is not that
courts may now be cutting down the claims of professors as they have done to
other professionals before them, but that until recently professors seemed to be
bucking the trend and finding a new constitutional foundation to elude legal
338
control.
Colleges and universities enjoyed nearly complete autonomy from legal
regulation before the 1950s, being seen as a different realm, akin to a religion or
the family, more than the marketplace. Beginning in the McCarthy era, a time of
rapid growth in the size and scope of higher education, the Court began to
articulate a constitutional rationale for continued deference. 339
As other
professional organizations came under greater legal oversight, however, it has
become ever more necessary to articulate and defend the separateness of higher
education. Yet it also has become more difficult. Colleges and universities
themselves have embraced more non-academic values, vast quantities of research
funded from outside, massive federal student loan policies, ever more garish
athletic entertainments, valuable licensing of intellectual property, and the sense
that members of the community have constitutional rights against the
340
community.
Given this erosion of image, broad changes in social power, and evolution of
the institutions themselves, is institutional academic freedom a desirable principle
in American constitutional law? Is it worth contending for? My response is an
emphatic "Yes," although success requires some agreement about the goals of
higher education, something rarely attained except at altitudes of meaningless
abstraction. In the next section, I offer a few preliminary thoughts about what a
principled institutional academic freedom might be for the future and how it might
be supported.

337. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-94 (1978)
(holding that price fixing by engineers violates antitrust laws); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 381-83 (1977) (stating that total ban on attorney advertising violates the First

Amendment).
338. Universities are subject to the antitrust laws, at least in activities not within the core
academic freedom. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 98-99 (1984) (holding that NCAA's plan to restrict the total number of live televised college
football games violates Sherman Act).
339. See, e.g., Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 313.
340. Professor Stanley Katz has recently expressed pointed concerns about the loss of focus
in university work and tied it to a broader loss in public confidence. Stanley N. Katz, The
Pathbreaking,Fractionalized,Uncertain World of Knowledge, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20,
2002, at B7, B9 ("The institutions have, sadly, become too large, arrogant, rapacious, and
impersonal for outsiders to understand and sympathize with . . . . [T]he institutions are
intellectually out of focus and out of control").
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B. Revival?
I have argued that the decline in constitutional academic freedom that typified
judicial decisions between 1990 and Grutter can best be explained by changes in
broad social assumptions and in colleges and universities themselves, as well as
the concerted actions of some individuals. A revival in institutional academic
freedom likely will also require broad changes in society at large and in colleges
and universities themselves, but also may depend on actions individuals and small
groups may take. In this concluding subsection, I will discuss both briefly.
The "culture wars" seem finished or at least dormant. An astute observer noted:
Today the wars are not exactly over; the situation is more like the
Korean armistice-with periodic saber rattling on both sides, but also
diplomatic missions across the border, and, most of all, a feeling of
exhausted confusion about what all the fuss had originally been about.
The combatants are getting old and the issues they fought over have
341
become yesterday's news.
A few firebrands may still fan the flames of indignation, claiming that school
policies against harassment create regimes of oppression, 342 but most faculty are
more concerned with encouraging thoughtful student speech than worrying about
rare vicious speech. Curricular changes have slowed, and the integration of large
numbers of minority students is an accepted fact. Budget and tuition are larger
concerns than canons of authors. Fewer cultural agitators focus more on issues that
have less resonance in the broader intellectual culture, such as Islam and internet
file swapping. 343 Perhaps Grutter itself may foster a new level of normative
341. Andrew Delbanco, In Memoriam, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 23-24 (Feb. 27, 2003).
Professor Marjorie Garber observes that "aesthetic judgment," no longer a discredited occupation
of dilettantes, has moved to the center of concern for academic humanists. MARJOR1E GARBER,
ACADEMIC INSTINCTS 48 (2001). "Almost everyone wants to talk about it: a concern with
aesthetics and ethics, the reappearance of certain notions of 'value' and 'values' on the literary
scene, has preempted the stage, moving critical attention away from a previous decade's concerns
with politics and cultural identity." Id.
342. See Beth McMurtrie, War of Words, CHRON. HIGHER. EDUC., at A31-32 (May 23,
2003) (describing how the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, headed by Professor
Kors, plans to sue numerous state universities for student conduct regulations that may burden
student free speech because "the future of America is at stake").
A curious variant is the "Academic Bill of Rights," promoted by David Horowitz. See
Sara Hebel, PatrollingProfessors'Politics,CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 2003, at A I8-A 19.
This is a set of principles that colleges and universities should follow in protecting academic
freedom, which Horowitz is urging Congress and state legislatures to adopt. Id. at A 18. Most of
the principles are not only unobjectionable, but express the core values of academic freedom,
although a few, such as the directive that faculty hiring be conducted with a view to "fostering a
plurality of methodologies and perspectives," convert a wholesome consideration into what could
become an ideological bat. See id. Moreover, it would be perilous to allow legislators to dictate
such terms or leave to courts the task of giving them meaning. What should be an academic
debate would become a legal and political one, with all that entails of autonomy lost to interest
groups. The AAUP has condemned academic bills of rights. AAUP, ACADEMIC BILL OF RIGHTS,
available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/SpchState/billofrights.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004).
343. These issues may be very important in themselves. See AAUP Special Committee,
Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis, 89 ACADEME, No. 6, 34 (Nov.-
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comfort with the basic outlines of the contemporary college or university.
But such conditions give only the opportunity for constitutional academic
freedom to gain a secure hold, they by no means ensure it will prevail. The case
for academic freedom, for the distinct character of the research institution, must be
made better than in the recent past, and may require some changes in practice to
remain plausible. An acceptable theory of institutional academic freedom requires
an explanation of how scholarship and teaching advance distinct First Amendment
values. It also requires an understanding of how academic governance and speech
rules, including individual academic freedom, nourish scholarship and teaching.
Finally, it requires an understanding of how political interference with the core of
academic governance threatens the achievement of the First Amendment goals. I
can attempt very little of this here, beyond what I have written already, but I will
pose suggestions for future work.
There always is a need in a democratic society to defend the modem college
and university philosophically and politically. Historically, college and university
presidents have exalted leaming, scholarship, and nurturing of tomorrow's leaders
in innumerable speeches before all kinds of audiences. However tedious these
performances, they kept in rhetorical currency traditional ideals. Such a role seems
beyond most contemporary presidents, busy fundraisers and institutional
mediators, who seem more concerned with not alienating important constituencies.
Interestingly, the most influential defense of affirmative action, an empirical study
of the success of minority graduates of selective colleges, was authored by two
344
retired university presidents.
Faculty, who benefit so handsomely from the structure of modern colleges and
universities, need to articulate and live by its ideals. Authors occasionally have
risen above boosterism and articulated academic ideals in vital connection with
current social concerns. Such work is often critical of the contradictions and
absurdities of current institutions. There is nothing lost from criticism of current
arrangements, when offered in pursuit of some attractive vision of what works.
But such writing often lacks a sense of what matters about colleges and
universities. The continued prominence of Newman's Idea of a University,345 in
addition to its literary merit, stems from its articulation of a coherent ethical sense
of higher education long lost in the pluralism of modern intellectual life. By now
we have traveled well beyond Clark Kerr's 'multiversity' 346 to a sometimes
bewildering diversity of inquiries and activities that stretch beyond the inherited
meanings of "know" or "learn." We need more serious writing about the values
these activities serve and their relative importance.
What such writing should accomplish can be seen in recent books on higher
Dec. 2003); Jeffrey R. Young, Napster and 6 Colleges Sign Deals to Provide Online Music to
Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 30, 2004 at Al.
344.

WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998). Derek Bok has

been an outstanding exception to my criticism, as a former president of Harvard who has written
thoughtful and constructive accounts of the problems and promise of higher education, as in his
recent UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

(2003).
345.
346.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (Martin J. Svaglic ed., 1982).
CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 1 (1963).
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education by Martha Nussbaum 347 and Alan Ryan. 348 Both authors defend a
concept of liberal education in which academic freedom plays an indispensable
part. Both authors base their vindications on the contributions such an education
makes to citizenship in an open society composed of diverse persons. Their views
thus connect with the reasons the Supreme Court has given for the special status of
academic freedom and address the most persistent concerns of critics of
contemporary higher education.
Nussbaum argues for a vision of liberal education that begins with a
commitment to Socratic inquiry and nurtures understanding and respect for those
of different ethnic, religious, and sexual identities. Her work is enriched by
discussion of exemplary and problematic attempts to accomplish these goals at a
variety of undergraduate institutions. For her, the goal of liberal education is the
creation of a certain type of "world citizen."
Our country has embarked on an unparalleled experiment, inspired by
these ideals of self-command and cultivated humanity. Unlike all other
nations, we ask a higher education to contribute a general preparation
for citizenship, not just a specialized preparation for a career. To a
greater degree than all other nations, we have tried to extend the
benefits of this education to all citizens, whatever their class, race, sex,
ethnicity, or religion. We hope to draw citizens toward one another by
complex mutual understanding and individual self-scrutiny, building a
democratic culture that is truly deliberative and reflective, rather than
simply the collision of unexamined preferences. And we hope in this
way to justify and perpetuate our nation's claim to be a valuable
member of the world community of nations that must increasingly learn
how to understand, respect, and communicate if our common human
349
problems are to be constructively addressed.
She defends contemporary humanities teachers against the complaints of cultural
conservatives, whom she urges to join hands to oppose the drift toward more
350
strictly vocational higher education.
Ryan takes an altogether saltier view of the terrain of higher education, but
comes out in a similar place. He begins with the question of the role of liberal
education in a liberal society that "encourages economic ambition and emphasizes
individual choice that espouses the meritocratic route to social mobility and takes
for granted the variability of our tastes and allegiances. ' 35 1 While realistically
canvassing the magnitude and scope of American higher education, he ends with
affirming for all who can profit from it a form of liberal education that would be
largely recognizable to his Victorian heroes, John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold.

347. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 307.
348. See RYAN, supra note 311.
349. Id. at 294.
350. Id. at 298-99. "It would be catastrophic to become a nation of technically competent
people. Who have lost the ability to think creatively, to examine themselves, and to respect the
humanity and diversity of others." Id. at 300. It is striking that such a prolific author would have
so little to say about how higher education nurtures scholarship.
351. RYAN, supra note 311, at 43.
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"[J]ust because the society offers so many incentives to acquire the vocational and
practical skills we require, it is all the more important to balance these pressures by
' 352
Like
disinterested, non-instrumental, and in that sense impractical education.
Nussbaum, Ryan believes that the mix of critical and sympathetic mental and
the individual
emotional traits acquired in a liberal education can be redemptive for
353
and offer the best promise for nurturing a desirable liberal society:
One of the central purposes of education is to overcome the sense of
being "thrown" into a meaningless world. Anyone who wants to
connect liberalism as a set of cultural and political ambitions with
liberal education as a commitment to a humanist and historical
understanding of human culture hopes that the second will sustain the
354
first and that the first will provide a proper shelter for the second.
These contemporary authors unite on the value of liberal education for
citizenship, emphasizing its ability to enhance both the critical and sympathetic
faculties and thus better equip graduates to deal with the open, diverse world of the
future. How helpful is their defense of liberal education for the support of
academic freedom? Neither seeks to connect teaching with scholarship. Nussbaum
exclusively concerns herself with teaching and curriculum, and Ryan views the
"research culture" as "characteristically inimical" to liberal education, research
teams resembling more "well-conducted military organizations" than "debating
societies. ' 355 Nussbaum also has nothing to say about academic freedom as such,
although Ryan does argue helpfully that it is not undermined by non-foundational
theories of knowledge. 356 They argue for a moral core to contemporary liberal
education that can appeal to a broad spectrum of educated citizens. Each argues
for a liberal education that educates students to be citizens who articulate justly
their own examined values and engage productively with the different perspectives
of others. The promise of this for civil society and polity may provide a basis for
renewing the "deal" between the academy and the public that Menand argued was
357
struck in the early twentieth century.
As a lawyer with little claim to philosophical sophistication, I am impressed by
the difference between speech in the college and university context and in society
at large. Speakers in academia are expected to speak carefully after study and
reflection in a manner that invites response from others who similarly care about
the topic. Whether in the classroom or in a journal, academic speech aspires to be

352.

Id. at 91.

353. Ryan appears to be more skeptical about multicultural education than Nussbaum, but
the difference may be mostly a matter of tone. Ryan writes:
Any education that makes people less interested in another society's vision of the world
has gone badly wrong .... Indefensible multiculturalism is not multiculturalism at all
but a rearguard attempt to protect cherished beliefs by forbidding one's children, one's
ethnic group, or one's co-cultists to discover that there are alternatives to local
prejudices.
Id. at 177.
at 181.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 149-51.
356. Id. at 154-62.
357. See MENAND, supra note 318, at 417.
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both serious and communal, seeking to improve the understanding of the topic held
by participants. It accomplishes this by setting proficiency standards for who can
participate in various discourses, in devoting time and space to discourses its
appropriate members deem important, and in regulating the manners of speech of
participants while guaranteeing their substantive freedom to engage in the
discourse.
While this regulatory system may err in particular cases and
participants rightfully contest where lines are drawn, it must continue to function if
colleges and universities are to continue to produce valuable intellectual goods for
society.
In Urofsky, Judge Wilkins argued that academic freedom could not be a distinct
constitutional right because it would give greater free speech rights to professors
than to other citizens. 358 What has been said here provides a reply to this familiar
concern. Professors' rights of academic freedom exist not for the benefit of the
professors themselves but for the good of society; academic freedom is
emphatically an instrumental right. Restricting this sphere of speech to professors
(and students in proper contexts) makes it feasible to articulate and critique more
knowledgeable and complex assertions about the world and persons, in ways not
possible on street comers or on television. Indeed, the "barriers to entry" are part
of higher education's regulatory structure that itself limits the types of expressions
permissible, even by its accredited members.
The supposed paradox of academic freedom is that a First Amendment right can
be seen to protect from governmental interference the authority of some public and
private actors to regulate the speech of individuals on account of its content.
While this peculiarity does invite questions about the reality of academic freedom
"on the ground," recognition of the importance of academic freedom raises
questions about the libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment that has
largely prevailed. Scholars in recent years who have emphasized the capacity of
some speech regulatory regimes to enhance the value of speech understandably
359
have looked at academic freedom as the epitome of a largely successful regime.
Preserving an existing, successful speech regime, such as academic freedom, is far
easier, both practically and doctrinally, than devising new constitutional rules to

358. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,412 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
359. Recent scholarship on the First Amendment has begun to explain how private
associations that structure speech rules may enhance the overall liberty of citizens. See, e.g.,
Roderick M. Hills Jr., The ConstitutionalRights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144,
175-88 (2003); Julien N. Eule and Jonathan D. Varat, TransportingFirst Amendment Norms to
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1537, 1623-33

(1998). Professor Hills argues that the institutional autonomy of speech communities enhances
individual autonomy by allowing individuals to choose among organizations that embody
different values or ends, by allowing then to exercise judgment and authority, and by engaging in
speech systems that, while inhibiting them in one direction, permit them to engage in complex
speech acts or games that would be impossible without the community. Hills, supra, at 178-82,
84-87. He thus usefully isolates values such speech regulators may provide their members. My
defense of academic freedom supports his view, as he suggests, but my defense rests on the social
value of academic speech rather than on enhancing anyone's individual autonomy, and it insists
on the unusual capacity of academic regulation to enhance the truth quality of its members'
speech while preserving to them a crucial core or free responsibility for their views. See Eule and
Varat, supra, at 1627-28.
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improve the quality of speech in an existing field, such as television or political
campaigns.
Academic speech thus embraces plausibly the truth seeking goal of the First
Amendment, associated with Mill. 360 Scholarship aims to provide improved
accounts of important issues, both through reasoned critique of prevalent work and
by new research. Fred Schauer long ago recognized that the truth-seeking
rationale for the First Amendment had the greatest plausibility when considering
"a select group of individuals trained to think rationally and chosen for that
ability. '361 He elaborated: "The argument from truth presupposes a process of
rational thinking. Indeed, one of its virtues may be that it encourages this process.
Yet because the process of rational thinking is the foundation of the theory, the
362
theory weakens or dissolves when the process does not obtain."
What is striking about academic freedom is that it is a system that employs
professional standards, peer review, and eligibility criteria to create systems of
scholarship and teaching that can advance understanding and challenge error. The
rules of discourse evolved by disciplines and methodologies, although themselves
ultimately challengeable, provide sophisticated frameworks for intellectual
exchange that succeed in part by eliminating voices, perspectives, and questions
from particular debates. 363 The point of academic freedom is to keep this structure
from non-academic interference, including efforts by federal judges to deregulate
individual speech in the name of more libertarian values.
Speech in the wider culture has less claim to advance these ideals of free
speech. Although serious discussions of ideas and politics go on outside colleges
and universities, they are confined largely to a few high-brow newspapers and
magazines, enjoying a love-hate relationship with higher education. So much
speech in the "media" is dominated by business interests concerned primarily
about profit. More authentic popular speech often either is ignorant of what others
have said on a topic or fails to connect with others prepared to respond so as to
advance understanding. In short, we lack enough cultural institutions outside of
colleges and universities to make most speech fruitful. While there are persuasive
arguments for protecting most of such speech, they often rely less on the value of
the speech than on concern about the worse effects of censorship.
One need not share the cultural pessimism of my account to accept my basic
point-colleges and universities have a distinct approach to speech that deserves

360.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 115-16 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1985).

361.

FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 26 (1982).

362. Id. at 30.
363. Disciplines and methodologies exist as specific attempts to provide criteria for what
should be thought true about a certain topic. The value of these different approaches must be
debated point by point and do not seem susceptible to any generally validating principles. In
Michael Williams's contextual approach to epistemology, new inquiries are possible only when
one accepts at least provisionally some framework and presuppositions that have developed
around the topic. "[H]ow much unity our methods of inquiry display and how those methods are
to be improved are retail questions, not susceptible of wholesale answers derived from our
general conception of knowledge and justification." WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 248. See also
Williams, supra note 305, at 132 (discussing the theory of knowledge and metaphysics in the
context of examination of methods of inquiry).
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reasonable deference from society at large. The justification for academic freedom
has always relied on the benefits of academic inquiry and teaching for society at
large. No other social institutions organize so many trained people and resources to
the advancement, understanding, and critique of knowledge. If one accepts that
increased knowledge, contemporary interpretations of tradition, and equipping
students with the capacity to think critically for themselves are real benefits
intimately connected with the ideals of the First Amendment, then some
constitutional protection for academic freedom seems appropriate. Such protection
must preserve the regulatory structure of higher education, such as the
requirements for entry to its protections.
The difficult question remains which aspects of a college's or university's
governance rules are so intimately connected to coordinating the speech of its
members that those rules deserve constitutional protection from civic
displacement. In an earlier article, I attempted to defend a distinction between
scholarship and instruction and those important functions of a college or university
promoting social mobility, prosperity, and entertainment. 364 The former areas
correspond to Justice Frankfurter's four freedoms of a university, respecting
decisions taken on academic grounds, and presumptively deserve constitutional
deference. The latter reflect areas where the modem college or university has
become entwined with broader social values and where the society through
government can dictate decision making. These areas cannot be considered closed
categories but a continuum between core academic concerns about teaching and
scholarship with which political power should not interfere and voluntary social
tasks undertaken by colleges and universities which could be performed as well by
some other social institutions and which are as properly regulated by government
as any business entity. For example, a court may not second guess a college's or
university's denial of tenure to a professor based upon the disagreement about the
intellectual value of her work, but it can find that the college or university violated
Title VII by denying her tenure based on the non-academic grounds of race or sex.
The task of placing some practice along this continuum and balancing the values
implicated by a particular form of government regulation can be performed by the
365
judiciary better than by any other social arbiter.
It is not surprising that admissions should have become a battleground over
what decisions properly may be left to colleges and universities and which should

364. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 21, at 281-83.
365. A recent question of the limits of constitutional academic freedom was raised by the
Solomon Amendment, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (West Supp. 2004), which requires
universities to allow the military to recruit on campus despite its discrimination against
homosexuals, violates academic freedom. In Forumfor Institutional andAcademic Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003), the plaintiffs argued that forcing universities to
accept military recruiters despite the schools' policies against sexual orientation discrimination by
prospective employees, violated their institutional autonomy, but the court gently but firmly
rejected the argument. Id. at 302. To me this argument cries, "wolf!" It may well be that
Congress has acted unconstitutionally in its irrational and cruel discrimination or that the
regulations are in excess of statutory authority, but the claim that the amendment violates
academic freedom, when they have nothing to do with teaching, scholarship, or curriculum, but
only the way students can be recruited for employment, may weaken claims of constitutional
academic freedom when they will need to be made.
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be subject to direct political control. Nicholas Lemann made the shrewd
comparison between elite universities setting admissions standards and the early
nineteenth-century Bank of the United States setting interest rates: both would be
perceived as elitist institutions setting the terms for success and advancement in a
366
society dominated by concerns about social mobility and material success.
Affirmative action could be viewed as an anomaly in an admissions system based
solely on neutral "meritocratic" criteria like grades and test scores. Grutter
declared fair an admissions system that "engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. ' 367 Justice
Powell was right to this extent, preferences by colleges and universities for
admitting under-represented minorities can be viewed as fair only if based on
educational grounds and if educational attractiveness for each candidate be viewed
in a broader context than tests and grades. The question will be whether approval
by the Court will foster a consensus about fairness that will allow persistent social
anxieties to find another symbol to engage.
If courts inevitably will be the arbiters of institutional academic freedom,
colleges and universities must bestir themselves to present their views cogently
before courts. With a few exceptions, colleges and universities have asserted
368
claims of institutional academic freedom either apologetically or not at all.
Grutter elicited several strong amicus curiae briefs arguing for recognition of
constitutional academic freedom. 369 But such briefs should be filed regularly in
appropriate cases in the courts of appeals, especially now that Grutter has made so
much clearer the doctrinal crux of the argument. Such briefs, of course, must also
demonstrate that colleges and universities are acting responsibly and no brief
should be filed when an institution fails to do so. Colleges and universities should
commit to long-term, coordinated litigation on their academic freedom rights, just
as other national interest groups have learned to do.
Such litigation will only be and only deserves to be successful if colleges and
universities fulfill the public interest functions they claim. They must nurture the
academic freedom of their individual members. They must encourage classrooms
that are lively and mutually respectful. They must value learning and the
"cultivation of humanity" more than wealth and prestige rankings. There is no
single or sufficient formula for living into these academic values. Indeed, they
conflict at points with the competition among institutions that has propelled many
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MERITOCRACY 346-48 (1999).
367. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
368. It is regrettable that no briefs emphasizing institutional academic freedom were filed
either in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), or Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 ( 4 th

Cir. 2000). Urofsky is particularly distressing, since the American Civil Liberties Union,
representing the plaintiffs, and AAUP, as amicus curiae, argued unsuccessfully for individual
rights, but neither the University of Virginia nor any association of universities argued for
institutional rights. The court wrongly found that the statute adequately protected institutional
interests. Id. at 411.
369. See Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen, et al., Grutter (No. 02-241); Brief of Amici
Curiae American Council on Education, et al., Grutter,(No. 02-241).
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of the creative and vital aspects of higher education. But competition for students,
faculty, research grants, contributions, and programs must be tempered by respect
for the common values of scholarship. In particular, colleges and universities need
to not exploit part-time faculty and graduate assistants, restrain executive salaries,
and limit the contagion of revenue-generating sports exhibitions. What seems
indispensable to progress is enhanced faculty governance over the core academic
issues of curriculum, teaching, and scholarship. As such, the health, dare I say the
revival, of the AAUP seems a central step.
CONCLUSION

Colleges and universities have endured for nearly a millennium because the
collaboration of scholars enhances their capacity to interpret and extend prior
learning. Modem knowledge must be corporately held rather than individually
mastered. Colleges and universities also educate the young, teaching sophisticated
knowledge and critical abilities that fit them for social leadership. Colleges and
universities are a precious resource, and the United States enjoys the largest, most
diverse, and energetic institutions in its history. They also constitute the socially
approved pathway for meritocratic social mobility. It is not surprising that, in the
past fifteen years, they have been such a topic of controversy.
Constitutional academic freedom provides colleges and universities breathing
space to make educational and scholarly policy without political interference. The
Constitution should do so to the extent that institutions act on legitimate academic
grounds without substantially harming a compelling governmental interest.
Legitimate academic grounds here means that a policy sincerely and reasonably
seeks to enhance the educational and scholarly mission, within the tradition of
individual academic freedom that has stood at the core of higher education for
many years. The paradox is that colleges and universities that so conduct
themselves will seldom need constitutional protection. But when they do, it is
imperative that lawyers understand how much is at stake.

